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20 U.S.C. § 1406(b)
BRIAN J. LEVY†
“The manifold ways in which we are continually blindsided by our
categories cannot be overemphasized.” 1
“The black four of hearts might, for example, be identified as the four
of either spades or hearts. Without any awareness of trouble, it was
immediately fitted to one of the conceptual categories prepared by
prior experience. One would not even like to say that the subjects had
seen something different from what they identified.”2

INTRODUCTION
In E.B. White’s The Trumpet of the Swan, Louis is a
young bird who is mainstreamed into public school. 3
Although exceptionally bright, Louis has a disability. He
cannot speak.4 First, Louis learns to read and write, but he
finds that his fellow trumpeter swans are unable to
understand his written words on his portable chalkboard
because they “had [n]ever seen a slate before, or a piece of
chalk.”5 The swans believe the only proper way to
communicate is the way to which they are accustomed:

† J.D., New York University School of Law. Thanks to Judge Harry Edwards and
Professor Linda Elliott for bringing Petit to my attention and for teaching me
about how important standards of review and precedent are; Bradley Maurer and
Andrew Milne for helping to develop some of the ideas about Petit herein;
Elizabeth Monachino, Emily Dinsmore, and the staff of the Buffalo Law Review
for their edits; Tommy Bennett, Megan Crowley, Derek Ettinger, and Eugene
Novikov for their keen suggestions; John, Janet, Andrew, and Harriet for their
support, and Elissa, who is expecting a joke here but gets special thanks instead.
1. DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER & EMMANUEL SANDER, SURFACES
ANALOGY AS THE FUEL AND FIRE OF THINKING 293 (2013).

AND

ESSENCES:

2. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 63 (4th ed.
2012).
3. See E.B. WHITE, THE TRUMPET OF THE SWAN 68-74 (spec. ed. 2000).
4. See id. at 41, 51.
5. Id. at 81-82, 87.
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trumpeting.6 Then, Louis’s father acquires a trumpet that
enables Louis to make noises despite his disability.7 Under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 8
Louis’s trumpet would be considered an assistive device, and
therefore Louis’s school might be required to provide services
relating to the device, like cleaning the spit valves.9 However,
not all children with disabilities will receive the services that
schools are required to provide under the statute.
Recently, the Department of Education promulgated
regulations that eliminate the IDEA requirement that
schools “map” the cochlear implants of deaf students. 10 The
Department of Education has thwarted Congress’s will.
Congress should do something! But, it turns out, it has. In
1983, Congress enacted 20 U.S.C. § 1406(b), a one-of-a-kind
law that forbids the Department of Education from
promulgating any regulation that “procedurally or
substantively lessens” protections afforded to children and
parents under the regulations in effect in 1983.11
Yet like the other swans who were unable to read Louis’s
chalkboard,12 lawyers, judges, and scholars appear to have
been unable to process § 1406(b). After nearly thirty years,

6. See, e.g., id. at 88 (“A Trumpeter Swan that couldn’t trumpet was a bust as
far as [Serena] was concerned.”).
7. See id. at 89-95.
8. Although IDEA has gone by many different names, see, e.g., infra notes 25,
29, and accompanying text, and § 1406(b) used to be § 1407(b), see infra notes 6364 and accompanying text, this Article uses the modern designations of the Act
and Section, except when making a historic point.
9. Cf. WHITE, supra note 3, at 106.
10. Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged; Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act—Assistance to States for the Education of
Children With Disabilities, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,748 (Apr. 9, 2007) (codified at 34
C.F.R. pts. 200, 300); Assistance to States for the Education of Children with
Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg.
46,540 (Aug. 14, 2006) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 300, 301).
11. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98199, sec. 6, § 608(b), 97 Stat. 1357, 1359 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1406(b) (2006)).
12. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 81-82, 87.
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no judge has ever struck down a regulation under § 1406(b),
and this is the first Article to extensively consider § 1406(b).
How did this happen? As discussed above, the trumpeter
swans in White’s book were habituated to thinking and
communicating only through trumpeting noises. Similarly,
this Article argues that expert legal reasoners have been
trained to think in certain analytical models that this Article
calls “categories.”13 Because § 1406(b) does not mesh with any
pre-existing categories that expert legal reasoners—like
judges or litigators—have acquired, these expert legal
reasoners do not fully process it, even though it is duly
enacted federal law. That is, the consequence of these
categories is a cause for concern, even for laws created by
Congress and consequently codified.
Part I of this Article explains the circumstances that gave
rise to § 1406(b) and shows how it has since been ignored by
courts, litigants, and scholars in the thirty years since it was
enacted. During the same thirty years, the Supreme Court
weakened IDEA’s purpose, and the Court and lower courts
made Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,14 Auer v. Robbins,15 and others the dominant
models in administrative deference—the same conceptual
space that § 1406(b) was meant to occupy. The combination
of these trends can be seen in Petit v. United States
Department of Education,16 the most in-depth engagement of
§ 1406(b) to date.
Part II explains the model of legal reasoning focused on
categories and argues that expert legal thinkers are driven
by their mental maps of the law. It suggests that some
categories are formed by branching off from other categories,
and that the way a category gains power is through
familiarity. Without any subsequent interpretation17 or an
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
15. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
16. 675 F.3d 769 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
17. Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 126 (1960
ed.) (citing Jethro Brown for the proposition that “a statute till construed, is not
real law[; i]t is only ‘ostensible’ law”).
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analogous statute to guide legal reasoners with regard to it,
§ 1406(b) is unable to be categorized and therefore intuitively
appears to have no meaning.18 Meanwhile, general and
wholly judge-made doctrines like Chevron and Auer
reverberate from court to court, judge to judge, and case to
case, with each voice giving the doctrines more force and
wider application as they resonate.19 Because Chevron and
Auer are deferential regimes, judges thus give power to the
Department of Education—the executive branch—to set
IDEA standards, even though Congress specifically tried to
limit judicial and executive discretion that would weaken
protections for students with disabilities.
Finally, Part III makes two normative arguments. First,
it argues that § 1406(b) must become “categorized,” a process
with close kinship to canonization. To become a powerful
category, § 1406(b) must become familiar to judges and
litigators. Therefore, the first half of Part III focuses on a
publicity campaign meant to emphasize the authority of
§ 1406(b). Next, Part III argues why § 1406(b) should be so
categorized. Section 1406(b) should be given full
consideration by judges and lawyers both because democratic
accountability requires that judges and agencies defer to
explicit policy choices made by Congress and because the
policy choice embodied in § 1406(b) helps compensate for the
Supreme Court’s mistaken understanding of the intent of
IDEA. Section 1406(b)’s specific purpose is to prevent future
Secretaries of Education from implementing the standards
rejected in 1983 and, therefore, to protect vulnerable
students with disabilities.

18. Arguably, another example of this can seen in Judge Bork’s assertion that
the Ninth Amendment—not an amendment in most judges’ toolboxes—
functioned like an incomplete sentence even though the full text is readily
available for interpretation. See Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive
Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. L.J. 759, 791 (1994) (quoting Robert H.
Bork, The Bork Disinformers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 22).
19. Cf. CARDOZO, supra note 17, at 21 (“Every judgment has generative power.
It begets in its own image.”).
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I. THE HISTORY OF IDEA AND § 1406(B)
The first Part of this Article describes the history of
§ 1406(b) and IDEA.20 Section 1406(b) can only be seen as a
reaction by a liberal Congress to the Reagan Administration’s
attempts to promulgate regulation that would lessen
requirements on state and local departments of education to
provide certain services for students with disabilities. Section
1406(b)’s method of preempting regulation that lowers that
floor has never been replicated in any other American law.21
Then, Part I describes the meager history of IDEA
litigation, focusing on Petit, and the simultaneous rise of
Chevron and other general deference cases. Thus, Part I
shows how Congress created an innovative law to limit
agency discretion, but space for review of agency action has
become occupied with and by judge-made deference doctrines
instead.
A. The Legislative History of IDEA and § 1406(b)
1.

Federal Education Legislation for Students with
Disabilities Before § 1406(b)(2)

Quickly following the groundbreaking Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),22 Congress passed
the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of
1966, which added a new Title VI to the ESEA.23 Title VI gave
grant money to states on the condition that they submit plans
that assured the Commissioner of Education that the money
they received would be used for projects that “meet the
special educational and related needs of handicapped
children” or at least “give reasonable promise of substantial
20. For the Supreme Court’s brief overview of the early history of IDEA, see
Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-81 (1982).
21. Searches of federal and state materials failed to unearth any similar
statute.
22. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C.).
23. Pub. L. No. 89-750, sec. 161, §§ 601-610, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204-08.
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progress toward meeting those needs.”24 In 1970, Congress
again made changes to ESEA with the 1970 Amendments
that redesignated Title VI as the Education of the
Handicapped Act.25 The new Title VI again provided grants
to states conditioned on receipt of plans and created several
other programs designed to help children with disabilities.26
In 1974, responding to two district court cases that
indicated that children with disabilities required better
access to education,27 Congress increased funding as an
“interim measure” that “for the first time required recipient
States to adopt ‘a goal of providing full educational
opportunities to all handicapped children.’”28
The next year, the basic framework for IDEA was
enacted in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975 (EAHCA).29 Unlike earlier statutes, EAHCA required
states to do more than merely set a goal for providing
educational opportunities. Under EAHCA’s—and now
IDEA’s—scheme, each state must submit a plan ensuring
that “all children with disabilities residing in the State
between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive” receive a “free
24. Id. sec. 161, § 604(a).
25. Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601, 84 Stat. 121, 175.
26. See id. §§ 601-662.
27. The two cases were Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), and Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). See
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 & n.2 (1982) (crediting those two cases
for the creation of 1974 and 1975 legislation); see also William D. White,
Comment, Where To Place the Burden: Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act Administrative Due Process Hearings, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1015-17 (2006)
(describing the cases and relating them to Congress’s 1970s legislation).
28. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180 (quoting Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-380, sec. 101, § 615(c), 88 Stat. 484, 583).
29. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. Indeed, the framework is so similar to the
modern IDEA that courts apply to IDEA cases construing EAHCA. See, e.g.,
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 232-33 (2009) (using Sch. Comm. v.
Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985), which construed the Education of the
Handicapped Act, to establish the legal baseline for the issue presented); Alyssa
Kaplan, Note, Harm Without Recourse: The Need for a Private Right of Action in
Federal Restraint and Seclusion Litigation, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 581, 590 n.60
(2010) (noting that courts continue to apply Rowley, which construed EAHCA).
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appropriate public education” (FAPE) in order to receive
grants.30 A FAPE must include, among other things,
statutorily defined “related services” that are “provided at
public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge” and are based on an “individualized
education program” (IEP) created for each child with a
disability.31 In addition to these requirements in the plan
itself, EAHCA “impose[d] extensive procedural requirements
upon States receiving federal funds under its provisions.”32
Four years after EAHCA, Congress created the Department
of Education and made its Secretary a member of the
cabinet.33
During the 1960s and the 1970s, the federal government
dramatically increased its role in education, primarily to help
disadvantaged groups, but the movement met political
headwind in the 1980s.34 In his 1980 campaign for the
presidency, former California Governor Ronald Reagan
promised he would abolish the recently created cabinet-level
Department of Education.35 Although Reagan never fulfilled

30. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1412 (2006); see also Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, sec. 5, § 614.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); see also id. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d); Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, sec 4, § 602; sec. 5, § 611.
32. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 182.
33. See Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 201,
93 Stat. 668, 671 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3411 (2006)).
34. See Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate
Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 138-39 (2013) (“[T]he federal government’s
focus in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s was primarily on expanding equity and access for
disadvantaged groups—African Americans, the poor, the disabled . . . . The march
toward deeper federal involvement in education came to a halt altogether in the
1980s.”); cf. Laura C. Bornstein, Contextualizing Cleburne, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 91, 106 (2010) (“Through the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government was
increasingly attentive to the problems facing [Americans with mental
disabilities].”).
35. See, e.g., Hedrick Smith, Reagan Calls for Repeal of Limits on Campaign
Funds and Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1979, at B10 (“[T]he former California
Governor said in an interview that if he was elected President he would seek to
dismantle the new Department of Education . . . .”); see also Shannon K.
McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: How
Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1520 n.7 (2011)
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that bold promise, supporters of federal education funding
had reason to fear a Reagan Administration because Reagan
proposed and implemented steep cuts to the California school
system. For instance, Reagan proposed eliminating the state
board of education’s full-time staff.36 Later, Reagan cut the
State Department of Education’s budget by twenty percent.37
Moreover, other Republican presidential candidates like
Texas Governor John Connally and George Bush adopted
Reagan’s position.38
2.

Bell’s 1982 Regulations Show Congress the Need to
Shield Its Act from the Department of Education

When Reagan became President, he staffed his
administration with hardline conservatives who wanted to
eliminate the Department of Education.39 However, Reagan’s
first Secretary of Education, Terrel Bell, was not one of those
hardliners.40 Bell had previously expressed “support for

(noting that Reagan-Republican opposition to federal involvement in education
began shortly after the creation of the cabinet-level Department of Education).
36. See State Senate GOP Leader Hits Some Reagan Economies, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1967, at I3.
37. See Robert Fairbanks, Rafferty Loses Power, Money in New Budget, L.A.
TIMES, July 6, 1970, at I3.
38. See Excerpts from Transcript of Debate Among 7 G.O.P. Candidates, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1980, at B12 (“I’d abolish the Department of Education.” (quoting
John Connally)); Warren Weaver, Jr., Running Mates Play Down Differences in
Their Positions, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1980, at A10 (“Mr. Bush’s views mirror
[Reagan’s] on . . . abolition of the Department of Education . . . .”).
39. For instance, Education Secretary Terrel Bell said that “‘radical nuts’ and
conservative right-wing zealots on the White House staff harassed him
constantly” and “a ‘lunatic fringe’ of midlevel staff members tried to abolish all
federal education programs, including aid to the handicapped.” Ex-Education
Chief Hits White House ‘Nuts,’ CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1986, § 1, at 14. Similarly,
Clarence Thomas wrote of the pressure from administration conservatives while
he worked in the Department of Education between 1981 and 1982: “Working in
the Reagan administration, you often got the feeling that no black person—
especially one who, like me, worked on civil rights policy—could ever be
conservative enough for some of the people who had supported the president early
on.” CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 144 (2007).
40. See Douglas Alexander, The Firing of Ed Curran, in STEERING THE
ELEPHANT: HOW WASHINGTON WORKS 316, 318 (Robert Rector & Michael Sanera
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creation of the separate Education Department”41 and was “a
staunch believer in federal spending on schools.”42
However moderate Bell may have been personally, the
Reagan Administration immediately and repeatedly
proposed slashing funding for students with disabilities and
turning federal education funding into more block grants
despite bipartisan congressional opposition.43 While
Congress could block budget cuts, the Administration did not
need Congressional approval to issue regulations that would
require provision of fewer services from the states that
administered IDEA.
On August 4, 1982, Bell released proposed rules that
would make sweeping changes,44 such as eliminating
“[r]equirements that schools get parents’ written consent to
educational plans for their handicapped children,” lessening
the preference for mainstreaming, and making the provision
of “[r]elated medical services . . . including eyeglasses, insulin

eds., 1987) (describing Bell as “a man fully identified with the education
establishment Reagan’s people had set out to abolish”).
41. Noel Epstein & Lee Lescaze, Terrel Bell Reported Choice To Become
Education Secretary, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1981, at A1. Bell would later produce a
plan to eliminate the Education Department’s cabinet-level status. See Spencer
Rich & Noel Epstein, President To Weigh Options on Education Department,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1981, at A3 (describing Bell’s plan and proposed
alternatives).
42. Judy Gibbs, Education Rerun for Bell?, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 8, 1981, at 8.
43. See GOP Joins Democrats in Battle over Budget, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3, 1982,
§ 1, at 1 (noting bipartisan opposition to Reagan’s proposed education budget
cuts); John Hildebrand, Budget Cuts Go to School, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 16, 1981,
at B3 (noting that under Reagan administration proposals “[f]ederal aid for
handicapped or disadvantaged students and for districts that are in the process
of racial desegregation would be reduced by 25 per cent”); More Cuts Slated for
Education, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1981, § 1, at 4 (“The Reagan administration will
again ask Congress for billion dollar cuts in grants and loans to college students
and programs to help teach the poor and handicapped . . . .”).
44. Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 47 Fed. Reg.
33,836 (proposed Aug. 4, 1982). For statements describing the import of these
regulations, see, for example, 128 CONG. REC. 27,637 (1982) (statement of Rep.
Leo Zeferetti) (“[I]f they are allowed to go into effect, [the regulations] would wipe
out the decade of gains in basic civil rights for the handicapped.”).
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injections or other medication” optional.45 Within a week, the
proposals drew “heavy fire from groups representing the
handicapped.”46
Congress quickly swung into action. On August 10, 1982,
Representative Mario Biaggi introduced a House resolution47
that disapproved of the proposed regulations because the
existing “regulations have provided ample safeguards for
handicapped children.”48 The same day, Senator Lowell
Weicker49 added an amendment to a supplemental
appropriations bill expressing the sense of the Congress that
the regulations not be adopted until Congress reconvened. 50
The Senate approved the amendment with a massive
majority, ninety-three to four,51 and it ultimately became
law.52
In response to the congressional and public pressure, Bell
withdrew the controversial parts of the regulations53 and
apparently did not finalize any of the regulations.54
45. Joanne Omang, Bell Withdraws 6 Proposals for Educating Handicapped,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1982, at A1.
46. Charles R. Babcock, Congress Challenges
Handicapped, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1982, at A4.

Education

Plans

for

47. H.R. Res. 558, 97th Cong. (1982).
48. 128 CONG. REC. 20,620 (1982) (statement of Rep. Mario Biaggi).
49. Weicker was himself the father of a child with Down’s syndrome. Keith B.
Richburg, Education Aide Defends Stance on Handicapped, WASH. POST, Apr. 18,
1985, at A3.
50. See 128 CONG. REC. 20,061-62 (1982) (statement of Sen. Lowell Weicker).
51. 128 CONG. REC. 20,063 (1982).
52. Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-257, § 305, 96 Stat.
818, 874-75.
53. See Susan Heller Anderson, The Reagan Effect: Goals on Handicapped
Meet Wide Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1982, (Fall Survey of Education), at
45 (“In a final admission of defeat, Terrel H. Bell, the Secretary of Education,
recently withdrew the Reagan Administration’s most controversial changes to the
regulations governing education for the handicapped. . . . The proposed changes
sparked angry protest from educators, legislators and parents the moment they
were announced.”).
54. The regulations continued to be on the Administration’s agenda in April
1983, see Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 48 Fed.
Reg. 17,962 (Apr. 25, 1983), but are not listed in the Federal Register thereafter.
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Even though Congress won that skirmish, members of
Congress complained that the Reagan Administration was
willing to abuse procedural rules. Under the then-existing
framework, Congress could reject final regulations by
concurrent resolution within forty-five days under the
General Education Provisions Act (GEPA), but the Act did
not toll the forty-five-day period for recesses.55 Both Biaggi
and Weicker argued that the Reagan Administration
deliberately issued the proposed regulations during a
scheduled congressional recess.56 Given the timing of these
regulations, the Department’s repeated submission of
budgets that cut funding for students with disabilities,57 and
a leaked memo indicating that the Department of Education
was considering how to circumvent Congress,58 Congress
needed stronger tools to turn back Administration efforts to
reduce funding and mandated services for students with
disabilities.59

55. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1982) (repealed 1994).
56. See 128 CONG. REC. 20,062 (1982) (statement of Sen. Lowell Weicker) (“This
amendment would postpone the start of the 45-day period allotted Congress for
passage of a concurrent resolution . . . .”); id. at 20,620 (statement of Rep. Mario
Biaggi) (noting that his resolution “reaffirms the right of Congress to disapprove
of any final regulations” and that regulations “should not become final during a
time when Congress is in recess”); see also id. at 22,539 (statement of Sen. Robert
Byrd) (“Great strides have been made in recent years, and I do not feel that any
changes should be made in existing law until Congress has had an opportunity to
review proposals . . . .”).
57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
58. See Jack Anderson, A Deceptive Scheme that Hurts Education for the
Handicapped, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 13, 1982, at 44 (describing a confidential
memo written by Bell’s special counsel that recommended sending controversial
changes in parts to Congress to try to fool Congress).
59. Senator Ted Kennedy showed Congress’s concern both with the
Administration’s substantive policy and its attempts to circumvent GEPA when
he attacked the alleged author of the 1982 regulations. See 128 CONG. REC. 27,163
(1982) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy).
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Following Bell’s Regulations, Congress Created a
Radical Law Limiting Its Delegation of Power so
that Administrations Could Not Substantively
Lessen Protections

Even though Congress stopped Bell from implementing
the proposed regulations this time, there was nothing to
prevent a future administration from proposing similar
regulations at a later date. Therefore, Biaggi drafted, and
Congress passed, a novel prophylactic measure that would
become § 1406(b). Biaggi took credit for the new section,
explaining that he drafted it in response to “the attempts
made by Secretary Bell last year to gut existing regulations”
and Bell’s “tireless assault on the regulations governing this
program.”60
Biaggi’s amendment prohibited the Secretary from
proposing regulations that weakened existing protections.
Biaggi explained: “The amendment also states that the
Secretary cannot propose any regulations which—in the
opinion of the committee—have the direct or indirect effect of
weakening the protections for handicapped children under
existing law and regulation.”61 With little other discussion of
Biaggi’s provision, Congress passed the Education of the
Handicapped Act Amendments of 1983.62 As codified, Biaggi’s
provision read:
The Secretary may not implement, or publish in final form, any
regulation prescribed pursuant to this Act which would
procedurally or substantively lessen the protections provided to
handicapped children under this Act, as embodied in regulations in
effect on July 20, 1983 (particularly as such protections relate to
parental consent to initial evaluation or initial placement in special
education, least restrictive environment, related services,
timelines, attendance of evaluation personnel at IEP meetings, or
qualifications of personnel), except to the extent that such

60. 129 CONG. REC. 33,316 (1983) (statement of Rep. Mario Biaggi). Biaggi also
noted that he strengthened Congress’s veto authority “by extending the public
comment period.” Id.
61. Id.
62. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98199, 97 Stat. 1357.
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regulation reflects the clear and unequivocal intent of the Congress
in legislation.63

The provision as passed in 1983 remained almost
entirely unchanged over the next three decades.64 Most
recently, it was reenacted in 2004, as § 1406(b), as follows:
(b) PROTECTIONS PROVIDED TO CHILDREN.—The Secretary may not
implement, or publish in final form, any regulation prescribed
pursuant to this title that—
(1) violates or contradicts any provision of this title; or
(2) procedurally or substantively lessens the protections provided
to children with disabilities under this title, as embodied in
regulations in effect on July 20, 1983 (particularly as such
protections related to parental consent to initial evaluation or
initial placement in special education, least restrictive
environment, related services, timelines, attendance of
evaluation personnel at individualized education program
meetings, or qualifications of personnel), except to the extent
that such regulation reflects the clear and unequivocal intent of
Congress in legislation.65

Under § 1406(b), the Secretary of Education is prohibited
from implementing or publishing any regulation that
“procedurally or substantively lessens . . . protections” that
were “embodied in regulations in effect on July 20, 1983.”66
Thus, § 1406(b) is a bold, “strongly worded prohibition”67 that

63. Id. sec. 6, § 608(b) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (Supp I. 1983)).
64. In 1988, Congress changed “IEP” to “individualized education program.”
Handicapped Programs Technical Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-630,
sec. § 101(d)(1), § 608(b), 102 Stat. 3289, 3290. In 1990, Congress changed
“handicapped children” to “children with disabilities.” Education of the
Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, sec. 901(b)(24),
§ 608(b), 104 Stat. 1103, 1143. In 1997, Congress changed “which” to “that” and
redesignated it as § 1406. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Amendments of 1997, 105 Pub. L. No. 17, sec 101, § 607, 111 Stat. 37, 47-48.
65. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-446, sec. 101, § 607(b), 118 Stat. 2647, 2660 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1406(b) (2006)).
66. Id.
67. Donna M. Sheen, Case Note, Accommodating Disabilities: How Far Must
Schools Go in Providing Related Services of a Medical Nature for Students with
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is meant to prevent regulations such as the ones proposed by
Secretary Bell, and it requires courts to second-guess
whether the Department of Education is furthering the policy
goals of IDEA.
Section 1406(b) has been reauthorized so many times by
Congresses controlled by both parties and signed into law by
presidents of both parties,68 suggesting strong bipartisan
support for this limitation on the delegation of regulatory
power to the Secretary of Education. Additionally, § 1406(b)
offers children with disabilities, their parents, and allied
interest groups the opportunity to try to get in litigation what
they may fail to get from notice-and-comment by allowing
them to dispute final regulations in court. The next Section
shows that, despite the obvious institutional and political
support for § 1406(b), courts and litigators have seemingly
ignored this provision when determining how much
deference to give to the Department of Education’s
regulations, while the Supreme Court has shrunk IDEA’s
scope and at the same time has expanded Chevron’s.
B. IDEA Litigation Lessens IDEA’s Scope, § 1406(b)
Litigation Is Rare and Tangential to Its Purpose, and
Chevron and Auer Grow to Occupy the Field of
Administrative Deference
As the rest of this Part shows, § 1406(b) has been used
rarely. Only once has a court addressed an argument for
invalidating a regulation based on § 1406(b).69 And in that
case, the D.C. Circuit applied the Chevron and Auer doctrines
instead of § 1406(b).
Section 1406(b)’s disuse is the result of three intertwined
developments in caselaw since 1982. First, the Supreme
Disabilities? Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999), 35
LAND & WATER L. REV. 625, 630 n.58 (2000).
68. President Clinton signed a version of § 1406(b) into law in 1997,
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, sec. 101, § 607(b), 111 Stat. 37, 47-48, and President Bush signed the
current § 1406(b) into law in 2004, Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, sec. 101, § 607(b), 118 Stat. 2647,
2660.
69. Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.3d 769 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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Court has eroded IDEA, relying on the limited purpose that
Justice Rehnquist ascribed to IDEA’s authors. Second, in
those same cases, the Supreme Court has excessively
deferred to the Department of Education. Third, while the
Supreme Court has been diminishing IDEA both
substantively and procedurally, it has simultaneously been
promoting more general models of administrative deference
in Chevron, Auer, and other cases.
Following the discussion of these three trends in this
Part I.B.1-2, Part I.B.3 describes the only three cases that
mentioned § 1406(b) between its enactment and 2008. Then
the concluding two Subsections of Part I.B describe recent
circuit court cases showing both newfound interest in
§ 1406(b) and how no court has yet to use § 1406(b) to
invalidate a regulation. In one case, the Eleventh Circuit
used § 1406(b) to sustain a regulation, even though § 1406(b)
was enacted to thwart regulations. And in Petit, the only case
to consider whether a regulation should be invalidated under
§ 1406(b), the panel relied on Chevron and Auer rather than
§ 1406(b).
1.

The IDEA that Never Came Together: Early Court
Interpretations of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act Granted Excessive
Deference to Regulations and Rewrote the Purpose
of the Law

As the above capsule history of IDEA shows, Congress
has been deeply engaged in the issue of special education for
several decades. From Congress’s Acts, it is clear that
Congress—or at least a succession of Congresses at the
moments of time when they expressed their wills70—wanted
the states to provide help to students with disabilities, but
exactly what and how much help was not clearly explained
in the text of the Acts.

70. See Thomas B. Bennett, Note, The Canon at the Water’s Edge, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 207, 244 (2012) (describing the difficulty in determining the intent of
“Congress” over time).
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“[T]he practice of law has been aptly termed an art of
prediction.”71 What must be predicted is “the incidence of the
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.”72 In
accordance with this construction, anyone trying to
understand the law created by a novel, complex, and
somewhat vague statutory scheme like IDEA73 would want to
know how courts will apply it in order to know what language
will be given what effect.
The best way to know how courts apply law is usually to
look to the earliest Supreme Court precedent on that law or
part of the law. The Supreme Court will turn to its earliest
precedent to describe a statute’s purpose, even when
construing alternate portions of the statute or dealing with
distinguishable fact patterns under stare decisis.74 Then,
given the judicial hierarchy, lower courts base their
71. JEROME FRANK, LAW & THE MODERN MIND 51 (Transaction Publishers 2009)
(1930).
72. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457
(1897).
73. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982) (“[The statutory
definition of ‘free appropriate public education’] tends toward the cryptic rather
than the comprehensive . . . .”); Murray ex rel. Murray v. Montrose Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 926-27 (10th Cir. 1995) (describing the dispute over the phrase
“least restrictive environment”); Mark C. Weber, Common-Law Interpretation of
Appropriate Education: The Road Not Taken in Rowley, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 95 (2012)
(describing the difficulty in construing “appropriate education” in IDEA’s
provision for a “free appropriate public education”); Judith Welch Wegner,
Variations on a Theme—The Concept of Equal Opportunity and Programming
Decisions Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 48 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 176-79 (1985) (describing the ambiguity in free
appropriate public education and its components); Note, Enforcing the Right to
an “Appropriate” Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1979) (“In effect, the Act guarantees
procedures whereby parents may challenge the appropriateness of their child’s
educational program, but provides only the most general guidelines for resolving
the substantive questions such challenges may present.”) (footnote omitted). See
generally Michael S. Treppa, Comment, The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act: Trends and Problems with the “Related Services” Provision, 18
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 427 (1988) (describing the difficulty in construing the
“related services” provision).
74. Cf. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Statutory Authority in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1093-94 & fig.1
(1992) (showing how in statutory interpretation cases before the Supreme Court,
“[b]y most measures judicial decisions are the dominant source of authority”).
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interpretations on Supreme Court precedent rather than the
text of the relevant statute.75 Again, the Supreme Court
precedent, in turn, usually refers to the Supreme Court’s own
first case on the matter. Therefore, Board of Education v.
Rowley, the first IDEA case before the Supreme Court, 76 and
Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, the first case to
discuss the deference to be given to Department of Education
regulations,77 are critical to the development of how IDEA is
applied and, relatedly, why § 1406(b) is not applied.
As can be seen below, the Supreme Court has relied on
its cramped holding that IDEA has a limited purpose—giving
students with disabilities access to some educational
benefit—and its naked assertion that the Department of
Education has the power to promulgate IDEA regulations,
while, at the same time, it has repeatedly ignored § 1406(b).
Indeed, a later case, Cedar Rapids Community School
District v. Garrett F. ex rel. Charlene F., shows that the
Supreme Court continues to give too much deference to IDEA
regulations while ignoring § 1406(b).78
a. Board of Education v. Rowley. IDEA and its
predecessor statutes teemed with terms of art that had no
prior or certain meaning.79 These then-uninterpreted phrases
left open the possibility that IDEA required, in the words of
one district court, “that each handicapped child be given an
opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with
the opportunity provided to other children.”80 If IDEA had
that sweeping purpose and no cost-benefit balancing, states
would be required to provide very expensive services for all

75. See Brian J. Levy, Note, Who Wants To Know—And Why?: The Supreme
Court’s Secret Purposivist Test for Exemptions from Association Membership
Disclosure Laws, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 473, 511 n.207 (2012) (describing how lower
courts interpret Supreme Court precedent rather than the underlying law).
76. 458 U.S. at 187 (noting that “[t]his is the first case in which” the Supreme
Court interpreted IDEA).
77. 526 U.S. 66 (1999).
78. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
79. See sources cited supra note 73.
80. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d per
curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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children with disabilities, even if the children could
compensate for their disabilities.81
The first IDEA case before the Supreme Court was
Rowley.82 In Rowley, the parents wanted a school to provide a
sign-language interpreter for their deaf daughter, Amy.83
Amy “[wa]s an excellent lipreader,” who was performing
better than the average child but was unable to hear all the
information in class because of her hearing loss.84 The district
court and court of appeals both held that Amy had a statutory
right to an interpreter under IDEA.85
Justice Rehnquist, generally hostile to the creation of
individual rights and to federal encroachment on state
power,86 writing for five Justices, reversed.87 Rehnquist
limited the purpose of IDEA, creating a crucial but false
touchstone for all subsequent construction of IDEA.
Rehnquist looked to two district court opinions referenced in
the Act’s legislative history88 that held that there was “a right
to public education for handicapped children . . . .”89 Because
those cases did not “purport[] to require any particular
substantive level of education,” Rehnquist held that IDEA
only required that the children with disabilities be “given
81. Cf. Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 77-78 (holding that IDEA is informed by “the
cost concerns Congress may have had” and “the potential financial burdens
imposed on participating States may be relevant to arriving at a sensible
construction of the IDEA” but also that IDEA “does not employ cost in its
definition of ‘related services’”); Treppa, supra note 73, at 440 (arguing that it was
wrong for the Supreme Court to “allow[] financial ramifications to impact [lower
courts’] decisions” as to what services were necessary for an appropriate
education).
82. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187 (1982).
83. Id. at 184-85.
84. Id. at 184-86.
85. See Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 946 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam),
rev’d, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 529.
86. See David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 293, 294 (1976).
87. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179.
88. Id. at 193; see supra note 27.
89. Steven N. Robinson, Note, Rowley: The Court’s First Interpretation of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 941, 941
(1983).
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access to an adequate, publicly supported education” and that
“the education to which access is provided be sufficient to
confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped
child.”90 In so doing, Rowley rejected the idea that States had
an obligation to “maximize the potential of handicapped
children ‘commensurate with the opportunity provided to
other children.’”91
Rehnquist’s version of IDEA’s purpose was immediately
attacked in Congress.92 It is generally agreed that
Rehnquist’s legislative history argument was wrong,93 and
that the Rowley standard is flawed.94 Moreover, as scholars
have argued, each successive reimplementation of IDEA
appears to reject the Rowley standard.95 As these scholars
90. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 193, 200-01.
91. Id. at 189-90 (quoting Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d, 458 U.S. 176
(1982)).
92. See 128 CONG. REC. 20,964 (1982) (statement of Rep. Charles Dougherty)
(disagreeing with Rowley because the policy that the Court rejected was “exactly
where we intended to go”).
93. See, e.g., Amy J. Goetz et al., The Devolution of the Rowley Standard in the
Eighth Circuit: Protecting the Right to a Free and Appropriate Public Education
by Advocating for Standards-Based IEPs, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 503, 509-11 (2011)
(arguing that the Rowley majority’s version of IDEA’s purpose was based on a
“largely selective reading of the legislative history” while lauding “the wellreasoned and articulate dissent”); Weber, supra note 73, at 95- 96 & n.6, 104;
Lauren A. Larson, Comment, Beyond Conventional Education: A Definition of
Education Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 48 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69-70 (1985). But see Wegner, supra note 73, at 185
(arguing that IDEA’s “ambiguity and lack of specificity” means that no one
arguing about its purpose “is able to refute the opposing views in an effective or
convincing manner”).
94. See, e.g., Laura Noble, The Meaning of a Free Appropriate Public Education
for Homeless Children: An Analysis of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act, 23 STETSON L. REV. 429, 450 & n.124, 457 & n.181 (1994) (“Many
scholars are not satisfied with the Supreme Court’s formula for calculating
whether an educational program is appropriate. . . . [T]here exists voluminous
scholarly criticism of the standard . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
95. See, e.g., Ellen A. Callegary, The IDEA’s Promise Unfulfilled: A Second
Look at Special Education & Related Services for Children with Mental Health
Needs After Garrett F., 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 164, 174-76 (2002) (arguing
that 1997 amendments to IDEA raised the floor higher than was set by Rowley);
Maureen A. MacFarlane, The Shifting Floor of Educational Opportunity: The
Impact of Educational Reform on Rowley, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 45, 46 n.6 (2012) (citing
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agree, when it passed each iteration of IDEA, Congress had
a broader purpose than the Rowley Court said Congress did.
But lower courts have generally held fast to the low standard
for minimum IDEA compliance announced in Rowley.96
b. Irving Independent School District v. Tatro. Rowley
was the first Supreme Court case to interpret IDEA, and it
set judicially imposed limits on the purpose of the Act. The
first IDEA case dealing with deference to the Department of
Education was Irving Independent School District v. Tatro,97
and it is therefore critical to the development—or lack
thereof—of judicial consideration of § 1406(b).
In Tatro, the Court was called upon to interpret whether
“clean intermittent catheterization” was a “related service”
that a state would be required to provide as part of a FAPE.98
One enumerated class of “related services” is “medical
services,”99 and the plaintiff argued that catheterization was
a medical service.100
In the process of determining what these statutory
phrases meant, a unanimous Court101 declared the
Department of Education’s regulations authoritative: “We
begin with the regulations of the Department of Education,
which are entitled to deference.”102 In a footnote, the Court
explained why the Department of Education’s regulations
are “entitled” to such unqualified deference: “The Secretary
sources); Andrea Valentino, The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act: Changing What Constitutes an “Appropriate” Education, 20
J.L. & HEALTH 139, 155 (2007) (arguing that the 2004 amendments to IDEA
superseded Rowley); see also Blake C. ex rel. Tina F. v. Dep’t of Educ., 593 F. Supp.
2d 1199, 1206 (D. Haw. 2009) (expressing confusion over a possible change in
standards).
96. See Jane K. Babin, Comment, Adequate Special Education: Do California
Schools Meet the Test?, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 227-30 (2000) (“[M]any courts
have relied on Rowley to deny services . . . .”).
97. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
98. Id. at 885-86.
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (2006); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982).
100. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 886-87.
101. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined the entire opinion except
a separate part dealing with attorneys’ fees. See id. at 896.
102. Id. at 891-92.
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of Education is empowered to issue such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act.”103
In this footnote, the Court neither mentioned § 1406(b)’s
explicit limitations on deference to Department of Education
regulations enacted a year earlier nor the Court’s own
groundbreaking case, Chevron, decided roughly two weeks
earlier.104 Instead, readers, including other federal judges,
were left with the flat assertion that the regulations “are
entitled to deference.”105 Recourse to § 1406(b)’s limitation on
deference would not have changed the result in Tatro because
the Court was relying on the very same regulations that set
the floor for protections under § 1406(b).106 However, by
skipping the step of § 1406(b), the Court established a model
for evaluating Department of Education regulations without
§ 1406(b).107
c. Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garrett F.
ex. rel. Charlene F. The echoes of Tatro’s excessive and
unlawful deference can be seen in Cedar Rapids Community
School District v. Garrett F. ex rel. Charlene F.108 In Cedar
Rapids, the majority ignored arguments for less deference to
Department of Education regulations, including the
argument based on § 1406(b) made by the federal
government in its amicus brief and at oral argument.109
The issue in Cedar Rapids was whether “continuous oneon-one nursing services” were “medical services,” a subset of
“related services” that school districts would be statutorily

103. Id. at 892 & n.9 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1417(b)).
104. Id.; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 67 U.S.
837 (1984); infra Part I.B.2.a.
105. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891-92.
106. See id. at 892 (citing three regulations from 1983).
107. In a later case, the Court gave the Department of Education deference
because the statute was ambiguous even before assessing its reasonability. Honig
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 n.8 (1988). Again, the Court failed to consider § 1406(b).
108. 526 U.S. 66 (1999).
109. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at *7-8, 23-24, Cedar Rapids, 526
U.S. 66 (No. 96-1793); Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S.
66 (No. 96-1793).
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required to provide.110 The Cedar Rapids majority explained
that, because of its holding in Tatro, the definition of “medical
services” would continue to be based on what had been
“reasonably determined” by the Secretary of Education.111
Because continuous one-on-one nursing services fell within
the purpose of IDEA and definition of “medical services” that
the Court previously limited in Rowley and Tatro, the Court
approved the mandate of nursing services.112
Even though the Court did not directly consider
regulations in Cedar Rapids, the Court majority, the federal
government—which was seeking to expand services—and
the dissenting Justices—who would deny nursing services—
all discussed the deference owed to the Department of
Education’s IDEA regulations.
The majority, in a footnote, maintained that, had the
Department clarified its position as to what constituted a
medical service excluded from the statute, the Court would
have deferred under Auer.113 In the footnote, the Court relied
on Tatro’s deference to the Secretary’s determination and
then unhelpfully “assume[d] that the Secretary has authority
under the IDEA to adopt regulations that define the ‘medical
services’ exclusion . . . ; and the Secretary surely has the
authority to enumerate the services that are, and are not,
fairly included within the scope of § 1407(a)(17).”114 Not only
did the Court weigh in to assert super-strong deference to the
Department’s power to issue and interpret its IDEA
regulations, it did so without considering the clear statutory
limits on delegation in § 1406(b) that were raised, if
tangentially, by the federal government.
The federal government’s § 1406(b) argument was at
least somewhat counterintuitive. In its brief and during oral
argument, the government argued that, in § 1406(b),
Congress codified the opposite of everything the proposed

110. Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 73.
111. Id. at 73-75.
112. Id. at 79.
113. Id. at 74 n.6 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
114. Id.
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regulations included.115 Because Reagan’s 1982 proposed
regulations allowed for consideration of costs when
determining whether nursing services were related services
in regulations, § 1406(b) showed that Congress disapproved
that consideration.116 Although some of the Justices engaged
the § 1406(b) argument in oral argument,117 no Justice
mentioned § 1406(b) in the opinions in Cedar Rapids.
Dissenting, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy,
raised a different deference argument. More than a decade
after the fact, Thomas explained that the Tatro Court failed
to perform all of the steps in Chevron: “Unfortunately, the
Court in Tatro failed to consider this necessary antecedent
question [Chevron Step One] before turning to the
Department of Education’s regulations implementing IDEA’s
related services provision. The Court instead began ‘with the
regulations of the Department of Education, which,’ it said,
‘are entitled to deference.’”118
The dissent shows that Tatro granted super-strong deference
to the Department—beyond that of Chevron and Auer—but
that since Tatro, Chevron had become a more prominent
model through which to view questions of deference to
administrative regulations. Moreover, Thomas’s warning is a
reminder that the majority was again modeling excessive
deference to the Department of Education regulations.
In Cedar Rapids, the Supreme Court did not include
§ 1406(b) in its analysis of regulations and was extremely
deferential to the Department of Education. In Tatro, the
Supreme Court suggested deference without limit. In Cedar
Rapids, the Court also assumed what appears to be virtually
115. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 109, at *7-8, 2324; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 44.
116. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 109, at *7-8, 2324; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 44. Advocacy groups raised
a similar argument in their amicus brief. See Brief of Nat’l Ass’n of Prot. &
Advocacy Sys. et al. as Amici Curiae at *10 n.4, Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. 66 (No.
96-1793). The school district responded that “[j]ust because Congress went on in
1983 and said you can’t lessen the procedural or substantive rights, I don’t think
you can say they endorsed” the bright-line test proposed by the Government.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 54.
117. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 53-55; see also id. at 30.
118. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro,
468 U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984)).
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unlimited deference, relying on Auer. The dissenting Justices
also would have ignored § 1406(b) and would have relied on
Chevron.
The next Subsection gives a brief synopsis of these
general deference regimes, which apply to regulations
beyond the education context, and shows that they have
expanded and multiplied since the passage of § 1406(b). As
can be seen in Cedar Rapids implicitly and Petit explicitly, a
broad reading of these doctrines, particularly Auer, would
cause them to eclipse § 1406(b) in practice.
2.

Generalized Deference Models Have Dramatically
Expanded in the Past Thirty Years

a. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. At roughly the same time Representative Biaggi
crafted § 1406(b) to prevent a particular administrative
agency, the Department of Education, from adopting
regulations that would weaken the statute, and the Supreme
Court gave statute-specific deference to that same agency in
Tatro, the Supreme Court created its current paradigm for
deference to all agencies in Chevron.119 Both § 1406(b) and
Chevron seek to answer the same question: When does an
agency have the power to issue a binding interpretation of a
statute? Chevron says an agency can interpret when
Congress delegates the power, often implicitly, and the
statute is ambiguous.120 Section 1406(b) says the Department
can only interpret IDEA if its interpretation does not
diminish rights existing in 1983.
Before Chevron, subject-matter specific interpretation
regimes used to be the norm. The Court made its decisions to
defer to agencies on a case-by-case—or at least subject-bysubject—basis.121 Indeed, the Supreme Court still applies a
119. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
120. Id. at 842-43.
121. Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations
of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1281 (“The Chevron analysis is
remarkable not in its deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the 1977
amendments, but in its apparent substitution of the Court’s longstanding caseby-case approach to such questions with a blanket rule of required deference to
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“continuum of deference regimes,” applicable in different
situations.122 But, in the past three decades, following the
lead of the influential D.C. Circuit,123 Chevron has become the
key deference regime that tells judges to defer to an agency
when an agency interprets a statute.124 It is a “foundational,
even a quasi-constitutional text—the undisputed starting
point for any assessment of the allocation of authority
between federal courts and administrative agencies.”125
Certainly its role in law school casebooks prolongs its life and
heightens its importance.126
the implementing agency’s interpretation in the event of statutory silence or
ambiguity.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1120-21 (2008) (“By 1984, the Court had
already announced Chevron-like or Chevron-lite deferential approaches in labor
law, tax law, treaty interpretation, securities law, environmental law, and other
areas.”).
122. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 121, at 1090, 1097 n.47 (“One would expect
that the perception of a Chevron Revolution would have discouraged litigants
from challenging some legally vulnerable agency interpretations that would have
been challenged under a regime perceived to be more skeptical, while agencies
would be encouraged to defend a broader array of interpretations they might have
abandoned under the previous regime.”).
123. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The
Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 58 (2013) (describing the
ascendancy of Chevron analysis in the D.C. Circuit and the migration of its
canonical status to the Supreme Court); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 838 (2001) (“The decision first
took on the status of a canonical statement about deference in the hands of
Reagan-appointed judges on the D.C. Circuit.”).
124. “[A] staple of modern federal administrative law doctrine is the principle
of judicial deference to administrative interpretations of both congressional
statutes and agency regulations. The seminal case on judicial deference to
reasonable agency statutory interpretations is, of course, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.” Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri
Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (2011).
125. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006). As
will be discussed in Part II, infra, Chevron’s text is not foundational. Rather, the
analytical model derived from Chevron and cases analyzing Chevron is.
126. See, e.g., James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, New Kids on the Block—A Survey of
Practitioner Views on Important Cases in Environmental and Natural Resources
Law, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 45, 46 (2010) (arguing that Chevron is unlikely
to “fall out of favor given its role as a mainstay of law school case books for
administrative law”); Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law:
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Chevron has been discussed in-depth elsewhere, so the
reader will be spared another rendition of how a unanimous
six-member Court approved the Reagan Environmental
Protection Agency’s “bubble concept,”127 and in so doing,
accidentally created a universal standard for handling
regulations.128 The key takeaway from Chevron is a twostep129 “Chevron test” to determine whether an agency’s
interpretation gets “Chevron deference.” Under the Chevron
test, a court “employ[s] traditional tools of statutory
construction” to determine “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.”130 If the statute
“unambiguously authorizes or forecloses” the agency’s rule,
then a court “follow[s] Congress’s express policy choice.”131 If
the statute is ambiguous, “step two of Chevron requires that
[a court] defer to [the agency’s] reasonable interpretation.”132
Although that test is very deferential, another deference
regime created—or, perhaps, revived—after Chevron is at
least as likely to apply in a hypothetical § 1406(b) case.
Because the major issue in a § 1406(b) case is what rights
were created by the regulations in effect on July 20, 1983, the
interpretation of those regulations is almost as important as
An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in
United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 289 n.4 (2002) (“[M]ost scholars
would agree that no [administrative law] class would be complete without a
comprehensive review of the Skidmore and Chevron decisions.”).
127. See generally Jack L. Landau, Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC: The Supreme
Court Declines to Burst EPA’s Bubble Concept, 15 LEWIS & CLARK ENVTL. L. REV.
285 (1985).
128. See Lawson & Kam, supra note 123, at 30 (“[W]hen Chevron was briefed
and argued in the Supreme Court, no one thought it was a case involving any
serious, general question about the standard of review for questions of law.
Instead, all the parties and the Justices understood the case to be an important
but relatively narrow dispute about the permissibility of the ‘bubble concept’
under the Clean Air Act, with no broader implications for administrative law
doctrine.”).
129. Sometimes Chevron is described as having a third step, “Step Zero.” See
generally Sunstein, supra note 125.
130. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842,
843 n.9 (1984).
131. Sierra Club v. EPA, 536 F.3d 673, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
132. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
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the interpretation of IDEA. When a court considers an
agency’s interpretation of regulations, it applies a much
stronger form of deference, generally known as Auer
deference.133
b. Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala. In Thomas
Jefferson University v. Shalala, the Supreme Court revived
the dormant doctrine now known as Auer deference.134 Under
this standard of deference,
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations . . . must be given
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation. In other words, [a court] must defer to the
Secretary’s interpretation unless an alternative reading is
compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications
of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s
promulgation.135

This deference is so strong that the Thomas Jefferson
majority deferred to the agency’s interpretation of its
regulation even though Justices Thomas, Stevens, O’Connor,
and Ginsburg held that the agency's interpretation “r[a]n[]
afoul of the plain meaning of the regulation and therefore
[wa]s contrary to law in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act.”136
c. Auer v. Robbins. In Auer v. Robbins137 and successive
cases, “the Supreme Court seems to be sending the lower
courts an unmistakable, if implicit, message that they should
confer extraordinary deference on agency interpretations of

133. Auer deference is also known as Seminole Rock deference. Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 82 (2011) (“But the Court now refers to the [Seminole Rock]
doctrine by reference to its 1997 opinion in Auer v. Robbins.”) [hereinafter Pierce,
Studies of Judicial Review].
134. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
135. Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945),
and Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see id. at 506 (majority opinion)
(concluding that “the Secretary’s interpretation is a reasonable construction of
the regulatory language”).
137. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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agency rules.”138 This deference is so strong that one recent
study found that the Supreme Court defers to agency
interpretation of agency rules ninety-one percent of the
time.139
Indeed, Auer greatly magnifies the power of that broad
Thomas Jefferson/Seminole Rock deference because Auer
allows for deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations made after a dispute about the regulations
arises.140 In Auer, a unanimous Court relied on the
Department of Labor’s interpretation of its own regulations
that was provided in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court.
The Court held that the Department of Labor’s position in its
amicus brief was not “unworthy of deference” because it
arrived in “the form of a legal brief.”141 Auer, however,
includes limiting language that would appear to be a key
caveat. The Auer Court explained it would defer to the
Department of Labor’s legal brief because it was not a “post
hoc rationalizatio[n] advanced by an agency seeking to
defend past agency action against attack” nor was there
reason to “suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question.”142
However, the routine and perfunctory way in which
many courts have deferred to an agency’s litigation position
suggests that courts do not seriously consider any caveats to
138. Pierce, Studies of Judicial Review, supra note 133, at 85.
139. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 121, at 1099 tbl.1. However, another study
concluded that lower courts were apparently roughly equally as deferential to
Chevron arguments as to Auer arguments. Richard J. Pierce & Joshua Weiss, An
Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 520 (2011).
140. See Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But for How Long?):
Justice Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 11, 33 (2007) (commenting that, in Auer, the Court said that
“the most recent interpretation appeared to be prepared in response to the
litigation” and noting more recent cases in which the Supreme Court deferred to
post hoc rationalizations); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 124, at 1493-94
(suggesting that all litigation briefs are “post hoc”).
141. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
142. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Auer.143 That is, in many cases, courts assert there is no
reason to believe the agency’s position is not fair and
considered, and then they defer to the agency without
explaining how that conclusion was reached.144 This is true
even though courts have reason to be skeptical that litigation
positions are fair and considered as a general matter.145 For
instance, during a lawsuit, an agency might assert an opinion
about its regulation even though “no policy-making official
has even considered, much less approved, the position the
lawyer is taking in litigation.”146 In some circumstances, the
Court and some lower courts do take the “fair and considered”
caveat seriously.147 Indeed, Auer deference may wither away

143. See Elbert Lin & Brendan J. Morrissey, No Notice, No Deference: Agency
Deference After Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 81 U.S.L.W. 228, at
*2,
http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/documents/LinMorrisseyBNA.pdf
(“These limits rarely come into play, however.”); see also Scott H. Angstreich,
Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency
Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 49, 55 (2000) (noting that, in the immediate
aftermath of Auer, circuit courts took a broad reading of Auer and used it to grant
deference to administrative interpretations in agencies’ briefs); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559, 611
(2006) (describing “the willingness of courts to defer to agency interpretations of
ambiguous agency rules in enforcement proceedings, even when the
interpretation urged in the enforcement proceeding is inconsistent with both the
agency interpretation announced before the conduct at issue and with the
agency’s current rules”) [hereinafter Pierce, Democratizing]; cf. Angstreich,
supra, at 146-47 n.449 (noting that the D.C. Circuit explicitly, and the Supreme
Court implicitly, placed the burden on the challenging party to show that the
agency’s interpretation was not fair and considered).
144. Courts assert without showing proof that an agency's position is fair and
considered or that there is no reason to believe the agency's position is not fair
and considered. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131,
1139 (2011); AKM LLC v. Sec’y of Labor, 675 F.3d 752, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
145. See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 124, at 1493-94 (arguing
against deference to litigation briefs).
146. Pierce, Democratizing, supra note 143, at 607.
147. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-67
(2012) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462) (internal quotation marks omitted); Exelon
Generation Co., v. Local 15, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 676
F.3d 566, 575-78 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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in the near future,148 but, to the extent that “not just a post
hoc rationalization” is boilerplate allowing for deference to
exactly such post hoc rationalizations, Auer is immensely
powerful.
When Auer deference is given to the Department of
Education,149 it deprives § 1406(b) of effect. Section 1406(b)
only constricts the power of the Department when the
Department could be said to contravene pre-1983
regulations. If the Department can redefine the pre-1983
regulations under Auer whenever a party asserts that the
Department’s present-day regulations contravene them, then
§ 1406(b) would only matter when the Department violates
an unambiguous pre-1983 regulation. Thus, courts that do
allow the Secretary of Education to reinterpret 1983
regulations at will give the Department the power to bypass
all § 1406(b) challenges.150
148. See Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Deference Still Up for Grabs, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 18, 2012, 11:36 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/18/auerdeference-still-up-for-grabs.
149. Although the Department of Education is the actor that writes the
regulations, it may be that, in a given litigation, state and local governmental
units are the actors that seek Auer deference when the regulations do not require
the provision of costly services. See, e.g., D.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Balt. Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs, 706 F.3d 256, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2013); Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d
260, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2012).
When a school district or state or local governmental unit is given Auer or Chevron
deference because it relies on a Department of Education regulation, it also
deprives the students of protections that may have been preserved under
§ 1406(b). See N.D. ex rel. Parents v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1115
(9th Cir. 2010) (applying Chevron deference). But cf. E.T. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 11CV-5510, 2012 WL 5936537, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012) (applying case
law to hold against the parents in the face of Auer deference). Although in some
situations, deference to the Department of Education may cut in favor of the
student or parents. See, e.g., Moorestown Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. S.D., 811 F. Supp.
2d 1057, 1071-74 (D.N.J. 2011).
150. Auer deference may have more play in the IDEA context because IDEA’s
statutory framework and its controlling regulations may be more opaque than
others. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982) (“[The statutory
definition of ‘free appropriate public education’] tends toward the cryptic rather
than the comprehensive . . . .”); D.L., 706 F.3d at 259 (“The plain language of the
statute and the regulations does not make clear whether public schools are
required to provide services to students enrolled in private schools.”); Ridley, 680
F.3d at 276 (“[N]either the text of the IDEA nor the IDEA regulations provide
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The power of this deference can be seen in Cedar
Rapids.151 In Cedar Rapids, the Supreme Court deferred to
the Department’s litigation position that would limit the
provision of medical services152 even though the Department
“maintained conflicting positions” prior to the litigation.153 As
it did in Cedar Rapids and other cases,154 the Department of
Education can use Auer deference to make up new law when
challenged.
In the mid-1990s, the same period when Thomas
Jefferson and Auer were written, it was becoming
increasingly clear that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
agency actions was becoming untethered. For instance, the
Supreme Court’s rulings gave deference to administrative
decisions even when those decisions were not meant to have
the force of law.155 At the same time Chevron was spreading
its roots, § 1406(b)—meant to freeze, or at least set a floor on,
the real world impact of the Department’s IDEA regulations
and prevent future Departments from interpreting away
rights—was lying dormant. The next Subsections show that
dormancy by describing the few cases that mention or
consider § 1406(b).

much guidance as to the effect of [a statutory] provision in this case.”) Taylor v.
Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 779 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J.) (“[T]he federal
regulations are inartfully drafted.”).
151. See supra Part I.B.1.c (describing Cedar Rapids).
152. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garrett F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S.
66, 74 n.6 (1999).
153. Id. at 83 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. See Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.3d 769 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Kay
Hennessy Seven & Perry A. Zirkel, In the Matter of Arons: Construction of IDEA’s
Lay Advocate Provision Too Narrow?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 193, 211
(2002) (“[T]he Department of Education clarified its position in the amicus curiae
brief submitted to the Delaware Supreme Court to support the parent advocates
in Arons.”).
155. See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They
Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 4 (1996) (“Decisions and opinions of the
Court have the effect of conferring the practical force of law upon documents and
positions which under the APA and organic statutes do not possess the force of
law.”).
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There Were Only Three § 1406(b) Cases Between
Its Enactment and Petit, and None Considered
Invalidating a Regulation Because that Regulation
Lessened a Pre-1983 Protection.

Between the enactment of § 1406(b) in 1983 and Petit in
2008, only three federal or state cases touched on § 1406(b).
None addressed the argument that a given regulation was
invalid for procedurally or substantively lessening
protections embodied in regulations in effect on July 20,
1983.
In the first case, Board of Education v. Roy H., the
district court cited § 1406(b) merely to support its argument
that IDEA and its attendant regulations were designed to
prize parental consent in the placement of students with
disabilities.156 In Roy H., there was no dispute about the
validity of a regulation.157
In the second case, Murray ex rel. Murray v. Montrose
County School District,158 the Tenth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s argument, which resembled the Government’s
argument in Cedar Rapids.159 In Murray, the plaintiff argued
that IDEA included a policy of “neighborhood schools”
because Secretary Bell’s proposed 1983 regulations allegedly
would have ended a “neighborhood school” policy.160 By
passing § 1406(b), the plaintiff argued, Congress codified the
opposite of all of Bell’s proposed regulations.161 The Tenth
Circuit held that the plaintiff’s creative argument was
irrelevant because the “plain meaning of the statute,” which
did not refer to “neighborhood schools,” controlled.162 The

156. No. 93 C 3252, 1995 WL 12249, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1995) (construing
then-§ 1407).
157. See id.
158. 51 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 1995).
159. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
160. Murray, 51 F.3d at 929-30 (construing then-§ 1407).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s certiorari petition,163
which presented, among other questions, the question as to
“[w]hether a 1983 amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 140[6](b), ratified
the extant regulations and interpretations of the U.S.
Department of Education.”164
In the last case, Michael ex rel. Stephen C. v. Radnor
Township School District, the plaintiff argued that policy
memoranda issued by the Department of Education’s Office
of Special Education Programs did not have the force of
law.165 The district court, quoting Chevron at length, held that
the memoranda had the force of law in part because the
Secretary’s interpretation was “reasonable,” even though,
under amendments to IDEA passed following the
interpretation, the interpretation would not have had the
force of law.166 Although that holding should have concluded
the case, the district court added that the memoranda had
the force of law because the Secretary was empowered to
issue regulations that did not procedurally or substantively
lessen protections in the 1983 regulations and the plaintiffs
did not show a regulation prior to 1983 that would have
created rights that were lessened by the policy memoranda.167
The district court thus read § 1406(b) in a very unusual
manner, suggesting that the Secretary was empowered to
give any statement the force of law so long as no pre-1983
regulations were violated—rather than reading § 1406(b)
literally such that it only limited the promulgation of
regulations intended to have the force of law. On appeal, the
Third Circuit affirmed the district court, but made no
reference to § 1406(b).168

163. Murray ex rel. Murray v. Montrose Cnty. Sch. Dist., 516 U.S. 909 (1995).
164. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Murray, 516 U.S. 909 (No. 95-208).
165. Michael C. ex rel. Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., No. C.A. 98-4690,
1999 WL 89675, at *3 & n.9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 1999), aff’d, 202 F.3d 642 (3d Cir.
2000).
166. Id.; Michael C. ex rel. Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642,
650 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000).
167. Michael C., 1999 WL 89675 at *3 n.9.
168. Michael C., 202 F.3d at 650 n.6.
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These three cases were the first to mention § 1406(b), but
none were used to argue that regulations promulgated by the
Department violated parents’ and children’s rights under
IDEA as embodied in pre-1983 regulations. That there were
so few cases mentioning § 1406(b) and none that applied the
literal text of § 1406(b) shows that § 1406(b) has essentially
been ignored by courts and litigators. Other evidence that
most lawyers have bypassed § 1406(b) can be seen in court
cases and secondary sources that assert that the Department
is owed deference but do not mention § 1406(b).169 In these
169. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 70 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[S]hould some such need arise—i.e., if nonuniformity or a particular
state approach were to prove problematic—the Federal Department of Education,
expert in the area, might promulgate a uniform federal standard, thereby limiting
state choice.” (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (Supp. IV 2000) and Irving Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891-93 (1984))); Alief Indep. Sch. Dist. v. C.C. ex rel.
Kenneth & Nneka C., 655 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The Secretary of
Education is authorized to issue regulations under the IDEA ‘to ensure that there
is compliance with the specific requirements’ of the statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1406(a).”);
Dixie Snow Huefner, Commentary, The Final Regulations for the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA ‘04), 217 ED. LAW REP. 1, 1 &
n.3 (2007); Thomas A. Mayes, Denying Special Education in Adult Correctional
Facilities: A Brief Critique of Tunstall v. Bergeson, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 193,
202 & nn.64-65 (“Congress has empowered the United States Department of
Education to issue regulations to enforce the IDEA, and the judiciary largely
defers to the Department’s interpretation and implementation of the statute.”)
(footnotes omitted); Scott Goldschmidt, Comment, A New IDEA for SpecialEducation Law: Resolving the “Appropriate” Educational Benefit Circuit Split
and Ensuring a Meaningful Education for Students with Disabilities, 60 CATH. U.
L. REV. 749, 763 & nn.99-100 (2011) (“Congress has assigned the Department of
Education as the administrative agency required to enforce the IDEA. As a result,
the Department of Education has the responsibility to issue rules and regulations
for the IDEA.”) (footnote omitted); Michael T. McCarthy, Note, Don’t Get the
Wrong IDEA: How the Fourth Circuit Misread the Words and Spirit of Special
Education Law—And How To Fix It, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1707, 1745 & n.230
(2008) (“For similar reasons as stated above, the ED is the most appropriate
governmental body to tackle this problem—it possesses the necessary tools and
the power to promulgate a rule that takes into account the vulnerabilities of
school systems and parents.”). Both Mayes and Goldschmidt cite Chevron as the
justification for judicial deference under § 1406(a). Mayes, supra, at 202 n.64;
Goldschmidt, supra, at 763-64 & nn.101-05.
There is at one counterexample to this trend. In a footnote in another recent case,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that IDEA regulations that defined
“‘extracurricular and nonacademic activities’” were valid in part because they did
not procedurally or substantively lessen protections. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12
v. Minn. Dep’t of Educ., 788 N.W.2d 907, 912, 914 n.7 (Minn. 2010).
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examples, echoes of Tatro’s super-deference can be heard
loud and clear while § 1406(b) has been ignored. Congress’s
clever response to Bell has essentially been unrung.
Two recent cases in the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits
suggest an increased interest in § 1406(b). Confronting a
§ 1406(b) argument head-on, the D.C. Circuit relied on
Chevron, Thomas Jefferson, and Auer to give deference to the
Department’s ad hoc interpretation and deny substantive
protections provided by pre-1983 regulations. In Jefferson,
the Eleventh Circuit used § 1406(b) to uphold a regulation,
much as had been argued in Cedar Rapids and Murray.
4.

Petit Was the First Time a Court Seriously
Grappled with § 1406(b), but It Was Still Too
Deferential

The district and appellate courts in Petit were the first to
openly address whether Department of Education
regulations must be invalidated for procedurally or
substantively lessening protections.170 Rejecting the
plaintiffs’ § 1406(b) argument, the courts relied on Chevron
to hold against the students.
The regulations at issue in Petit were 2006 regulations
that the plaintiffs argued substantively lessened students’
rights to school-funded mapping of cochlear implants.171
Cochlear implants are devices implanted in the ear to help
deaf children hear.172 They consist of an external component
with a microphone and processor and an internal component

170. As noted above, the Supreme Court was confronted with a § 1406(b)
argument in Cedar Rapids but chose not to address it. See sources cited supra
notes 110-17 and accompanying text. In at least two other cases, circuit panels
have ignored references to § 1406(b) in one of the parties’ briefs. See Ga. State
Dep’t of Educ. v. Derrick C., 314 F.3d 545 (11th Cir. 2002); Brief of Appellees at
*44-45, Derrick C., 314 F.3d 545 (No. 02-11578); McQueen ex rel. McQueen v.
Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 488 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2007); Opening Brief of
Joshua McQueen, at *15 n.2, McQueen, 488 F.3d 868 (No. 06-1169).
171. Petit v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 578 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149 (D.D.C. 2008)
(explaining that whether the statute and regulations apply to mapping is the
basis of the dispute).
172. Id. at 149-50.
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that stimulates electrodes in the auditory nerve.173 “Mapping”
is the process by which a specialist adjusts the implant so
that the internal component “provides the optimal amount of
stimulation to the auditory nerve.”174 Multiple mapping
sessions are required to ensure that the implant works
properly.175
In 2003, the parents of H.P., a young boy in New
Hampshire, won a court victory against their school district
when the district judge held that mapping was a “related
service” that the school district was required to provide for
H.P. under IDEA.176
Shortly thereafter, in 2004, IDEA was comprehensively
amended.177 When the 2004 Amendments were reported out
of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, the Senate Committee report explained that the
Committee did “not intend that mapping a cochlear implant,
or even costs associated with mapping . . . be the
responsibility of a school district.”178 This conclusion was
based on the Senate bill’s proposed changes to the definitions
of “assistive technology device” and “related services” that
would have excluded “a medical device that is surgically
implanted, or the post-surgical maintenance, programming,
or replacement of such device, or an external device
connected with the use of a surgically implanted medical
device.”179
If the Committee bill had been passed unchanged, there
would be no argument as to whether Congress wanted
mapping included as a related service. Thereafter, however,
the language that clearly removed mapping from related
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. See Stratham Sch. Dist. v. Beth P., No. 02-135-JD, 2003 WL 260728, at *1
(D.N.H. Feb. 5, 2003).
177. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1480-1482)
(2006).
178. S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 8 (2003).
179. Id. at 8, 102, 107.
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services was deleted unanimously in what was called a
“technical amendment.”180 If the amendment was, in fact,
purely technical, mapping would still be forbidden by statute.
However, the Committee’s designation of the amendment as
“technical” is irrelevant to the interpretation of its
substantive import. The Supreme Court assesses whether
“technical” amendments make substantive changes to
determine whether to disregard legislative history and
language that predates the amendment.181 Therefore, as
chairman of the committee and the sponsor of the
amendment would aver after the passage of the 2004
Amendments, the purpose of the “technical amendment” was
in part to remove the restriction that eliminated mapping as
a related service.182
Comprehensive regulations soon followed the passage of
the 2004 Amendments.183 Although these regulations were
180. See 150 CONG. REC. 9375-76 (2004); see also S. Amend. 3150 to S. 1248,
108th Cong. (2004). Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1)(B), (26)(B) (“The term does not
include a medical device that is surgically implanted, or the replacement of such
device.”), with S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 102, 107 (“The term does not include a
medical device that is surgically implanted, or the post-surgical maintenance,
programming, or replacement of such device, or an external device connected with
the use of a surgically implanted medical device (other than the costs of
performing routine maintenance and monitoring of such external device at the
same time the child is receiving other services under this Act).”).
181. Compare Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States
ex rel. Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1407-08 (2010) (disparaging the usefulness of
legislative history for an earlier draft because “[s]ignificant substantive
changes—including the introduction of the term we are construing in this case—
were inserted without floor debate, as ‘technical’ amendments”), with Bloate v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 n.2 (2010) (noting that the Court was citing
to a statute according to how it was currently codified rather than how it was
codified during the appeal below because Congress’s “technical changes . . . did
not change the substance of any provision relevant here”).
182. Letter from Sen. Judd Gregg to Margaret Spellings, Sec’y of Educ., June
24, 2005, reprinted in J. App. at 41-42, Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.3d 769
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 11-5033).
183. See Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged;
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act—Assistance to States for the
Education of Children With Disabilities, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,748 (Apr. 9, 2007)
(codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 200, 300); Assistance to States for the Education of
Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities,
71 Fed. Reg. 46,540 (Aug. 14, 2006) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 300, 301).
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“convoluted (and often contradictory)” and could actually be
read to include mapping as a related service,184 the
comprehensive regulations interpret “related services” not to
include “mapping,”185 while allowing children with cochlear
implants to receive other related services,186 such as routine
checking of hearing aids and external components of
surgically implanted medical devices.187 When promulgating
the regulations, the Secretary of Education relied on the
Senate Committee report without taking into account that
the report was based on the language deleted by the
“technical amendment.”188 The “maintenance, programming,
or replacement” of a surgically implanted device was no
longer outside the ambit of “related services.” As a result, the
regulations that excluded mapping rested on language that
was disapproved by the Senate Committee, never considered
by the full Congress, and never enacted into law.
Shortly after the promulgation of the regulations, a
district court in Tennessee held that a preschooler, A.U., was
entitled to have her school pay for the mapping she had
already received until the regulations were promulgated
because the regulations clearly excepted mapping from the
category of related services.189
Both H.P. and A.U.’s district courts held that IDEA and
its attendant regulations provided for mapping as a related
service. Neither the statute nor its regulations changed
markedly since 1983 with regard to audiology services.190
Assuming those district courts were correct, any regulation
that excluded mapping “substantively lessen[ed] the
protections provided to children with disabilities . . . , as
184. See Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.3d 769, 792-93 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Henderson, J., concurring).
185. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(b)(1) (2013).
186. Id. § 300.34(b)(2)(i).
187. Id. § 300.113.
188. See Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With
Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,569-70 (citing S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 8 (2003)).
189. See A.U. ex rel. N.U. v. Roane Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1134,
1143-44 (E.D. Tenn. 2007).
190. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.13(a), 300.13(b)(1) (1983).

2014]

20 U.S.C § 1406(b)

415

embodied in regulations in effect on July 20, 1983” without
the “clear and unequivocal intent of Congress in
legislation.”191
Together, the families of H.P. and A.U. sued the
Department of Education in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, arguing that the offending
regulations were contrary to law, in violation of § 1406(b) and
the Administrative Procedure Act.192 Applying the Chevron
test, the district court granted the Department summary
judgment on the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act
claims.193
Two years later, the district court turned to the plaintiffs’
other claims, including their § 1406(b) claims.194 The
plaintiffs argued that the new regulations (1) contradicted
the statute and (2) substantively lessened protections in
effect in 1983.195 First, to figure out whether the regulations
contradicted the statute, the district court relied on Tatro to
determine that it should defer to the Department’s
regulations when dealing with ambiguities in the statute.196
Then, to determine whether the Department was abridging
protections embodied in its pre-1983 regulations, the district
court used Thomas Jefferson deference, which allowed the
Department to redefine its old regulations in the middle of
the litigation.197
The plaintiffs appealed but fared no better before the
D.C. Circuit. Indeed, the court of appeals used the same
analytic frameworks as the district court. First, the court of
191. See Complaint ¶ 29, Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 578 F. Supp. 2d 145
(D.D.C. 2008) (No. 07-1583 (RMU)).
192. Petit, 578 F. Supp. 2d 145.
193. See id. at 154-60.
194. Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 756 F. Supp. 2d 11, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d,
675 F.3d 769, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
195. Id. at 15.
196. Id. at 16 (“In determining the standard for its review of the plaintiffs’ IDEA
claim, the court takes instruction from the Supreme Court’s decision in [Tatro].”).
197. Id. at 16-18 (“Although Tatro failed to specify the amount or type of
deference to which the Secretary’s regulations are entitled, the court finds
guidance in [Thomas Jefferson, among other cases].”).
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appeals dismissed the plaintiffs’ statutory argument by
giving Chevron deference to the Department’s new
regulations, holding that the term “audiology services” in the
statute was ambiguous, and the Department’s regulations
were owed deference because they were “rationally related to
the goals of the IDEA.”198
Then, in an alternative holding, the D.C. Circuit made
short work of the plaintiffs’ § 1406(b) argument. The D.C.
Circuit applied Thomas Jefferson deference to allow the
Department of Education to redefine the arguably
ambiguous pre-1983 regulations, so that the term “audiology
services” in the pre-1983 regulations did not include
mapping.199 Thomas Jefferson deference was appropriate, the
majority said, “[b]ecause the Department has never
previously interpreted the 1983 regulations with respect to
the question of mapping.”200
But this is beside the point. The Department’s position
after 1983 should not be relevant in a § 1406(b) argument if
§ 1406(b) is to have any meaning. Allowing the Department
to interpret away protections through interpretation of its
own rules, a procedure with fewer safeguards than the
regulations that § 1406(b) constrains, makes no sense.
The decision to apply Thomas Jefferson—which, again, is
essentially another name for Auer deference—was critical.
Had the circuit not applied Auer deference, it would have
been confronted with the question as to whether the
regulation’s
definition
of
“audiology
services”—an
unbounded list that included the “[d]etermination of the
child’s need for group and individual amplification, selecting
and fitting an appropriate aid, and evaluating the
mapping,
effectiveness
of
amplification”201—included
knowing that the import of § 1406(b) was that Congress
required no substantive diminution of any protections in the
1983 regulations. Indeed, § 1406(b) seems even more
applicable in Petit than in a case involving other regulations
198. Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.3d 769, 780-85 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
199. See id. at 790-91.
200. See id. at 790. But see infra note 210 and accompanying text.
201. Petit, 675 F.3d at 790 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(1) (1983)).

2014]

20 U.S.C § 1406(b)

417

because § 1406(b) bars any regulation that “procedurally or
substantively lessens the protections provided to children
with disabilities . . . []particularly as such protections relate[]
to . . . related services.”202
Without this Thomas Jefferson/Auer deference, the best
result would be to invalidate the 2006 anti-mapping
regulations on the grounds that they substantively lessen
protections embodied in the pre-1983 regulations. Thus,
Auer, a judicial doctrine of deference, defanged the plaintiffs’
§ 1406(b) argument, even though § 1406(b) is a statutory tool
to limit deference.
Not only was the application of Thomas Jefferson/Auer in
Petit inappropriate because of its implications for § 1406(b),
but it was also (1) inconsistent with both Gonzales v.
Oregon,203 and Auer itself and (2) a misreading of the pre-1983
regulations. Gonzales created a new “canon” that prohibits
Auer deference when an agency alleges to be interpreting its
own regulation or rule that merely parrots the statute.204 One
of the 1983 regulations that the Department alleged to be
interpreting merely repeated the definition of “related
services” at the time in its inclusion of “audiology” as a
related service.205 It is true that the 1983 regulations then
went on to define “audiology,” which was undefined in the
statute. But the 1983 regulation defining “audiology” was
non-exclusive. The definition was an open-ended list
following the word “includes,” and one of the items following
the word “includes” was “selecting and fitting an appropriate
aid, and evaluating the effectiveness of amplification.”206

202. 20 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (2006).
203. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
204. Id. at 257 (“Simply put, the existence of a parroting regulation does not
change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the regulation but
the meaning of the statute. An agency does not acquire special authority to
interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to
formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory
language.”).
205. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a) (1983), with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982).
206. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(1).
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The circuit seemed to recognize that it was applying the
same analysis to the Department’s interpretation of the
statute as it did to the Department’s interpretation of the
pre-1983 regulations when it attacked the plaintiffs’
argument about how to interpret the regulation as being
cumulative of its Chevron argument.207 This suggests that the
regulation was merely parroting the statute. Yet rather than
lower its level of deference—the D.C. Circuit should have
been looking to see whether the regulation substantively
lessened rights rather than whether it was plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation under Thomas
Jefferson/Auer or not contrary to the plain language under
Chevron—the D.C. Circuit simply applied roughly the same
deference as it did under Chevron.208
Most importantly, the circuit’s application of Thomas
Jefferson/Auer was inappropriate in Petit because it violated
the key caveat in Auer itself. The Department of Education’s
position in Petit did not even rise to the level of a “post-hoc
rationalization,” which, according to Auer’s caveat, would
receive no deference.209 The Department’s “position” in Petit
was even weaker than a post hoc rationalization because, in
oral argument before the D.C. Circuit, Department’s counsel
claimed the Department had never taken a position at all on
whether the 1983 regulations considered mapping a “related
service!”210 The panel gave no indication that it considered the
issue regarding when the Department took its position,
looking only to whether the Department’s interpretation was
clearly inconsistent. Indeed, it did not even mention the key
buzzwords “post hoc rationalization” or “fair and considered
207. See Petit, 675 F.3d at 790 (“But, as Appellants admit, this is the same
argument that they advance at Chevron step one.”).
208. See id. at 778, 780, 791 (relying on a Chevron-based holding in Nat’l Cable
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2004) and discussing whether
judicial precedent makes the plaintiffs’ interpretation the unambiguous one).
209. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
210. See Oral Argument at 43:06-43:49, Petit, 675 F.3d 769 (No. 11-5033),
available
at
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings.nsf/DocsBy
RDate?OpenView&count=100&SKey=201111 (conceding that whether mapping
was a related service before the 2004 Amendments is “something that the
Secretary hasn’t taken a position on,” adding “this is something that the Secretary
never had occasion to address”).
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judgment.” Its explanatory parenthetical for Auer stated,
“agency’s interpretation of its own regulation has controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”211
In addition to, and as a result of, all of those problems,
the Circuit’s application of Thomas Jefferson/Auer yields
troubling policy incentives. Applying deference in this
situation creates incentives for agencies to issue broad or
vague regulations and never interpret them unless
challenged.212 Thus, in the IDEA/§ 1406(b) context, when the
Department is given deference on its pre-1983 regulations,
and its 1983 regulations are allowed to parrot the statute, the
Department has no incentives to modernize or otherwise
clarify vague 1983 regulations. Indeed, the vaguest pre-1983
regulations are now the Department’s greatest asset should
the Department want to lessen or otherwise vary protections.
Petit was the first case since the enactment of § 1406(b)
where a court considered a § 1406(b) argument to invalidate
a regulation. But, as seen above, the D.C. Circuit read
§ 1406(b) such that it hardly constrained the Department.
Under § 1406(b), litigants and courts were supposed to use
1983 regulations as a fixed floor for substantive and
procedural rights below which the Department could not go.
As the D.C. Circuit read the statutory scheme by giving
Thomas Jefferson/Auer deference, the floor is not fixed but
rather controlled by the Department—the very entity
§ 1406(b) was meant to constrain.
While it is possible that the D.C. Circuit’s
acknowledgement of the literal meaning of § 1406(b) could
cause more courts to consider such arguments, Petit does not
seem to have jumpstarted interest in § 1406(b). Instead, Petit
has been cited as both an exemplary Chevron case and for the

211. Petit, 675 F.3d at 793 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
212. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule
encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future
adjudications, to do what it pleases.”).
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proposition, following Thomas Jefferson, that an agency is
entitled to deference for its own regulations.213
Petit’s understanding of IDEA regulation deference
analysis—apply Chevron or Auer—is often promoted by the
Department. For instance, the Department recently argued
that its interpretation in another case “warrants substantial
deference because [the Department] has implementing
authority for the IDEA, and this interpretation is reasonable
and ‘fill[s] any gap left’ by the IDEA’s ambiguous terms.”214
However, there has been one post-Petit case so far in
which a court considered § 1406(b). In that case, Philip C. ex
rel. A.C. v. Jefferson County Board of Education,215 § 1406(b)
was used to stop the invalidation of a regulation and, perhaps
even more ironically, that § 1406(b) argument was raised by
the Department of Education.
5.

Philip C. ex rel. A.C. v. Jefferson County Board of
Education

In Philip C. ex rel. A.C. v. Jefferson County Board of
Education, a county school board appealed a district court
decision that upheld a regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 300.502, that
requires schools to pay for “independent educational
evaluations” (IEEs).216 In that litigation, both the parents—
who won below—and the United States government argued
to the Eleventh Circuit that § 1406(b) required upholding the
regulation. They reasoned that, because a pre-1983
regulation required schools to pay for IEEs, a regulation that
requires the schools to pay for IEEs today must be upheld.217
213. See Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 706 F.3d 499,
503-04 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Colo. River Cutthroat Trout v. Salazar, 898 F. Supp. 2d
191, 200 (D.D.C. 2012); United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d
248, 258 (D.D.C. 2012).
214. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 13,
E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., appeal docketed, No. 1215743 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 2012) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), and citing 20 U.S.C. § 1406(a)).
215. 701 F.3d 691 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 64 (2013).
216. See id. at 698.
217. See Brief of Appellees at 15, Jefferson Cnty., 701 F.3d 691 (No. 11-14859)
(“1406 forbids the Secretary of Education from promulgating any regulation
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The Eleventh Circuit agreed that the Department’s
regulation must be upheld under four separate rationales.
Under its primary holding, the Eleventh Circuit adopted
the § 1406(b) arguments that the Supreme Court ignored in
Cedar Rapids and the Tenth Circuit rejected in Murray.
Under these arguments, § 1406(b) codifies the opposite of
whatever Secretary Bell proposed before 1983.218 In this case,
the Eleventh Circuit held that because the proposed
regulations, “in part, would have significantly curtailed a
parent’s right to a publicly financed IEE,” § 1406(b) makes
the opposite proposition a mandate of the statute.219
In its first alternative holding, the Eleventh Circuit
relied on the presumption that Congress was aware of earlier
court holdings that held that parents had a right to a publicly
financed IEE.220 In its second alternative holding, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the statute itself clearly mandated
publicly financed IEEs.221 In its third and final alternate
holding, the Eleventh Circuit applied basic Chevron analysis,
asserting that the regulation was not contrary to the statute
and was also reasonable.222
The primary holding is the most interesting because it
makes Jefferson County the first case in which § 1406(b) was
held to prevent a right from being substantially lessened.
However, the right was protected by upholding a regulation
rather than invalidating one. This is strange. As the school
which affords a parent less procedural protection than did IDEA’s 1988
regulations. Since parents had the right to a publicly funded IEE in 1988, 34
C.F.R. 300.502 is valid.”); Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees at 7, Jefferson Cnty., 701 F.3d 691 (No. 11-14859)
(“Because the 1983 version of the regulations afforded parents a right to a publicly
funded IEE, Congress’s enactment of § 1406(b)(2) and subsequent
reauthorizations of the IDEA in 1990, 1997, and 2004, reaffirm that parents have
a right to a publicly funded IEE in appropriate circumstances.”); see also 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.503 (1983).
218. See supra Part I.B.1.c (describing Cedar Rapids); supra notes 158-64 and
accompanying text (describing Murray).
219. See Jefferson Cnty., 701 F.3d at 696.
220. Id. at 696-97.
221. Id. at 697.
222. Id. at 698.
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board-defendant noted, “[Section 1406(b)] does not (and does
not purport to) constitute a delegation of rulemaking
authority to the Secretary; rather, it is a restriction on the
Secretary’s authority to regulate.”223 The Eleventh Circuit
turned § 1406(b) into an abstract principle—reverse
Secretary Bell’s proposed regulations and prevent such
regulations from being proposed in the future—rather than a
specific command.
Thus, Jefferson County speaks to § 1406(b)’s
indeterminacy of function and weakness of reputation. First,
Jefferson County’s use of § 1406(b) to uphold a regulation
shows that courts do not yet know what § 1406(b) means and
does.224 Second, Jefferson County’s backstopping its
“primary,” § 1406(b) holding with (not one, not two, but) three
alternative holdings strongly suggests they were
uncomfortable letting § 1406(b) pull the weight of their
analysis. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit was compelled to
buttress that argument with “real” authorities: congressional
intent, congressionally passed text, and Chevron.
As can be seen from the above, § 1406(b) appears to be a
powerful tool that has done nothing but rust. The next Part
argues that categorization, a generally beneficial process
correlated with expertise, has prevented legal reasoners from
grasping this tool.
II. CATEGORY AS CONCLUSION
This Part argues that successful legal thinkers rely on
“categories” and § 1406(b) has been ignored because it does
not fit existing categories. Part II.A offers a brief definition of
what this Article means by a category. Part II.B explains that
it is not § 1406(b)’s uniqueness that prevents it from
becoming a category, but rather its unfamiliarity. Finally,
Part II.C shows that categories are derived from cases, but
are not coextensive with them. These derivations are
distortions. That is the cases lose something in the
223. Reply Brief of Appellant at 9, Jefferson Cnty., 701 F.3d 691 (No. 11-14859).
224. When a new category is created or has yet to be created, perceptions of its
metes and bounds vary wildly. Cf. HOFSTADTER & SANDER, supra note 1, at 229
(“However, the possible interpretations for [an example of an ad-hoc category] are
extremely diverse . . . .”).
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compression to categories, much, for instance, as Audobon’s
paintings of wild birds do not truly recreate the bird. Thus,
Part II.C shows some dimensions of the Chevron and Auer
opinions that were flattened out in the categorization process
and suggests how they can be restored.
A. This Article’s Definition of “Category”
“The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by
example.”225 In the minds of skilled legal thinkers, these
examples tend to coalesce into categories,226 like medical
malpractice and community standards or athletic injury and
assumption of the risk. Roughly speaking, a category is the
most specific applicable flowchart or series of questions, 227
including, for example, the standard of review.228 It should
come as no surprise to any law student who prepared an

225. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949). If legal
thinking is about analogies, cf. Michael J. Gerhardt, How a Judge Thinks, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2185, 2195 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK
(2008)) (arguing that “reasoning by analogy” is “omnipresen[t] in judicial decision
making”), it is also about categories, see HOFSTADTER & SANDER, supra note 1, at
19 (“[I]t is misleading to insist on a clear-cut distinction between analogy-making
and categorization, since each of them simply makes a connection between two
mental entities in order to interpret new situations that we run into by giving us
potentially useful points of view on them.”).
226. Cf., e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 989, 1015-16 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaladi, trans.) (1988)
(describing how a lawyer predicts a rule by grouping certain salient cases
together).
227. See, e.g., Vikram Amar, The First Amendment in the 2009 Term: It’s All
About How You Frame It, 37 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 347, 350 (2010) (“The
choice of the ‘reasonable’ and viewpoint-neutral test—that is, the choice of the
appropriate doctrinal box or category on the First Amendment case law
flowchart—essentially dictated the result.”).
228. See FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW 67, 67-74 (Harry T. Edwards
& Linda A. Elliott eds., 2007) (describing how a standard of review is outcome
determinative).
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“attack outline” or flowcharts for a law school exam229 that
legal thinking is composed of these analytic models.230
These categories are so powerful that they can and do
overwhelm the literal text of a statute as with § 1406(b).231
That judges often apply some sort of consensus
understanding of the meaning of a law rather than the literal
text of a legal rule is well understood.232
When a lawyer or a judge is confronted with a problem,
he or she has to figure out which analytic model is the most
salient in order to “apply the law.” To accomplish this, one
could sit down with all known hornbooks and figure out what
law is applicable in most situations. As would be evident to
anyone staring at the mountain of bound paper,233 or as is
taught to law students even before they arrive, the first
choice is to find a subject.234 Is it a torts case? No, this is an
229. See, e.g., Barbara Glesner Fines, Lessons Learned About Classroom
Teaching from Authoring Computer-Assisted Instruction Lessons, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1094, 1108 (2012) (explaining the teaching power of flowcharts).
230. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV.
661, 696 (1989) (“Lawyers and judges engaged in paradigmatic classification use
a set of models or exemplars to identify cases with doctrinal categories.”).
231. For another example in which courts’ repetition have created a “wrong”
category, see Brian J. Levy, De Novo Denied: District Courts’ Reliance on Camardo
Is Clear Error, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 8 (2013),
http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/res-gestae/volume/82/8_Levy.pdf.
232. For instance, in a 1933 book, Professor Llewellyn noted that Judges Swan
and Crane among others recognized that judges were not merely following the
“verbal formula” or a statute or any other stated rule. Llewellyn, supra note 226,
at 1015, 1017-18 &1018 n.3.
233. See Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585,
1602-03 nn.96-105 (2012).
234. See
RONALD
DWORKIN,
LAW’S
EMPIRE
251
(1986)
(“The
compartmentalization of law into separate departments is a prominent feature of
legal practice. Law schools divide courses . . . . Legal and judicial arguments
respect these traditional divisions. Judicial opinions normally begin by assigning
the case in hand to some department of law, and the precedents and statutes
considered are usually drawn exclusively from that department.”); John A. Powell
& Caitlin Watt, Corporate Prerogative, Race, and Identity Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 885, 889 (2011) (“Sadly, one of the byproducts of
law school is to teach lawyers to separate out and categorize cases. We are taught
that Lochner is a civil rights case or that Slaughter-House is a corporations
case.”). It is for this reason that Kuhn’s analogy between a paradigm and a
textbook is inescapable. See Margaret Masterman, The Nature of a Paradigm, in
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education or administrative law case. For instance, in
constitutional law, First Amendment and Equal Protection
are types of cases. Is this about whether a regulation is
properly enacted under the Administrative Procedure Act?
No, this is a case where the issue is how to interpret the
statute. Just as it has turned out that the so-called
“indivisible” atom235 can be divided and further subdivided,
each category can be further divided236 until such division is
no longer conceptually useful. For instance, within Equal
Protection, one would likely stop at the tiers of scrutiny.
Within First Amendment, one might decide a problem was a
“public forum” problem and then within that, a limited public
forum.237 Often, the relevant analytic models have the names
of cases, like the O’Brien test for expressive conduct238 or the
Twombly/Iqbal standard for Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 59, 62 (Imre Lakatos & Alan
Musgrave eds., 1970) [hereinafter CRITICISM].
235. See, e.g., K.L. Planken, Brownian Motion and Molecular Size, VAN ’T HOFF
LAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND COLLOID CHEMISTRY 6 (2003), available at
http://www.seit.adfa.edu.au/staff/sites/hrp/Literature/articles/karel3Avogadro.p
df; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FSC-6910, 1 DOE FUNDAMENTALS HANDBOOK: NUCLEAR
PHYSICS
&
REACTOR
THEORY
2
(Jan.
1993),
available
at
http://www.hss.doe.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds/docs/handbook/h1019v1.pdf (“For
almost 100 years after Dalton established the atomic nature of atoms, it was
considered impossible to divide the atom into even smaller parts.”).
236. Cf. Feinman, supra note 230, at 699-700 (“There are different levels of
paradigms.”).
237. It is well known that “the First Amendment” is actually a series of
seemingly unrelated analytical models. See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR., A
WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987); see
also Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 397, 398 n.3 (1989) (book review) (collecting sources); Levy, supra note 75,
at 473 (creating such an analytic model under specific circumstances).
238. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private
and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 676 n.394 (2008) (describing the
O'Brien test without referring to the facts of O'Brien); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. REV. 54, 74-75 (same); Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman,
What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free
Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 281 n.301 (1998) (referring to the O'Brien
test without citing to O'Brien) (1998); see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968).
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Rules of Civil Procedure.239 Oh, I see. It’s about deference to
the agency so it’s Chevron. And the plaintiffs are challenging
the agency’s interpretation of its own rules, so it’s Auer.
In the same way an observer could follow a path from
living creatures on Earth to Animalia to Chordata to
Vertebrata to Aves to Anseriformes to Anatidae to Cygnus to
buccinators,240 one could place a case in its most fitting
category by following a branching tree down to its most useful
degree of specificity. This analogy makes clear, however, that
much of the “choosing” of an analytic model happens
“automatically.” A well-trained birdwatcher who sees the
swan is unlikely to consider whether the swan might be a
rock, a lizard, or even a duck. The range of choices for
categorization the birdwatcher would consider would be
fairly narrow and specific.241 By contrast, someone who knows
so little about birds that “swan” conjures up, say, family

239. Here, the individual opinions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), are so shorthanded that
many scholars have started referring to “Twiqbal,” the gestalt distillation. See,
e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013).
240. See AMBER TRAVSKY & GARY P. BEAUVAIS, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, SPECIES
ASSIGNMENT FOR THE TRUMPETER SWAN (CYGNUS BUCCINATOR) IN WYOMING, 24
fig.1 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/
wy/wildlife/animal-assessmnts.Par.56489.File.dat/TrumpeterSwan.pdf; see also
HOFSTADTER & SANDER, supra note 1, at 242 (“[I]f one examines any domain at all
carefully, one finds that it is filled to the brim with categories and
interconnections among them, and that such links form such a complex pattern
that it would astonish an outsider, who would have been tempted to see the
domain in the simplest possible way: as just one main overarching genus with a
few species one level below it.”).
241. For example, in Trumpet of the Swans, Sam who “knew a lot about birds”
was seemingly able to identify Trumpeter Swans because they were “great white
birds with their long white necks and black bills.” WHITE, supra note 3, at 2, 6.
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friendly ballet,242 an independent film,243 or difficult-toperceive risk244 would have to start from scratch.
Indeed, if much of this categorization did not happen
without conscious thought, lawyers would approach each
problem from the standpoint of the person who hopes to find
the answer from a mountain of hornbooks.245 As experts who
have seen quite a few birds are more likely to know a sparrow
from a swan, so, too, are more experienced lawyers, like
judges, able to determine category without conscious
forethought.
Thus, in most situations, deft and intuitive
categorization is to be commended. An eagle-eyed lawyer who
can convert a client’s narrative about his troubles with his or
her neighbor into a “textbook” nuisance action, for instance,
will have a real leg up on an inexperienced lawyer who is
unable to categorize as quickly.246 Similarly, the archetype of
a great judge is one who, through a combination of intuition
and learning, is about to “cut to the heart” of an issue.247
242. See State v. House, 676 P.2d 892, 896 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (en banc)
(Rossman, J., dissenting) (“We discern a marked difference between the type of
live public show this statute applies to and performances of ‘Romeo and Juliet’
and ‘Swan Lake.’”), modified, 681 P.2d 173 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (en banc), aff’d,
698 P.2d 951 (Or. 1985).
243. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784, 2013 WL
2495140, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013).
244. See Alec Orenstein, Note, A Modified Caremark Standard To Protect
Shareholders of Financial Firms from Poor Risk Management, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
766, 798 n.192 (2011) (describing Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s concept of a “black
swan”).
245. Cf. HOFSTADTER & SANDER, supra note 1, at 21 (“Thus our categories keep
us well informed at all times, allowing us to bypass the need for direct
observation. If we didn’t constantly extrapolate our knowledge into new
situations—if we refrained from making inferences—then we would be
conceptually blind. We would be unable to think or act, doomed to permanent
uncertainty and to eternal groping in the dark.”).
246. See, e.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 88 S.E.2d 88, 92-93 (N.C. 1955) (holding
that attracting wild geese could be a nuisance); Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431, 438 (Ct.
App. 1853) (recounting a lawyer’s argument that a British court held firing a gun
to scare ducks away from a decoy pond was a nuisance).
247. See, e.g., Dolores K. Sloviter, Dedication, Memorial Tribute to the
Honorable Albert Branson Maris, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 474 (1989) (“Judge Maris
also had an uncanny knack in dealing with administrative issues facing the court;
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Indeed, judges, who have the broadest knowledge and a
tremendous number of cases to solve, rely on these
“automatic” categories. As one study found, “[i]ntuitive
responses can also emerge from repetition of the same
deliberative procedure” and “conversion of deliberative
judgment into intuitive judgment might be the hallmark of
expertise.”248 Thus, lawyers with the most experience and
skill—like judges—are the most likely to have the most
powerful attachment to categories. The slotting of cases into
problems happens at an unconscious level,249 particularly
among stronger and more experienced legal reasoners,250
such that a case intuitively appears to fit a particular model.
The next Subsection explains how some of these categories
are created while others fail to be created.
B. Cases, Caveats, and Categories
This Subsection explains the difference between a
“caveat” and a “subcategory.” This Subsection further argues
that categorization affects major cases—not just odd ducks
like § 1406(b). In particular, it argues that categories are not
the same as cases, but rather imperfect derivations from
cases. This argument is advanced by showing that Chevron
he cut to the heart of the matter and put it in its appropriate perspective.”); Craig
Peyton Gaurner, Judge Koger Exemplified What a Judge Should Be, BANKR. CT.
DECISIONS WEEKLY NEWS & COMMENTS, Jan. 28, 2003, at 6 (“In weighing the facts
and law in cases pending before him, Judge Koger would quickly cut to the heart
of the matter. His independent knowledge of the law was broad . . . .”). Similarly,
Hindu legend reveres the swan for its purported ability to drink only the milk out
of a solution composed of watered-down milk. Gregory C. Frankel, Separating the
Milk from the Water: It Is All About Priorities, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479, 479
(2003).
248. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8, 30 (2007).
249. See Feinman, supra note 230, at 697 (“The judge’s perceptions of the
patterns in this realm preconsciously initiate the process of classification . . . .”).
250. Cf. HOFSTADTER & SANDER, supra note 1, at 342-43 (“For different people,
the salience of a given feature depends on their expertise in the given domain. . . .
[E]xperts, who in theory, could see and pay attention to all the same shallow
features as the novices are using, are ignoring those features, almost as if they
didn’t see them, just the way seasoned drivers ignore the color of the gearshift
they are using; . . . .”); id. at 427; FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 5
(2009).
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and Auer have become particular analytic models, unrelated
to their dicta. In so doing, it explains why courts have not
paid sufficient attention to the limitations of the Auer
doctrine intimated in the case of the same name.251
1. Caveats and Subcategories Defined
Thus, dicta or policy rationales in a given case often
become “caveats” or “subcategories.” “Caveat,” as defined by
this Article, is the limiting language or policy rationale in a
case that is not considered when the category gets applied.
Because judges and lawyers apply the models derived from
cases rather than the cases themselves, they may not notice
that the model they apply no longer fits within the
boundaries built by its homonymous case.252
On the other hand, there are clearly “subcategories,” in
which a new branch buds from an existing one. For instance,
Kuhn explains that an observer who chanced upon a black
swan would believe he or she had encountered a different
bird.253 That resembles the process of “subcategorization.”
Examples of these abound in the law. For instance, “separate
but equal” went from a one-step analysis—a justification for
state-sponsored racial segregation—254 to a two-step analysis
under which the key analytical framework was actually
scrutinizing for equality.255 Similarly, Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 took very
seriously Grutter v. Bollinger’s assertion of “a government
interest in student body diversity ‘in the context of higher
education,’” creating separate models of analyzing

251. Cf. Bennett, supra note 70, at 207 (describing how the Supreme Court has
offered shifting policy rationales for its canon against extraterritorial application
without reconsideration of the canon and without acknowledging that its original
principles no longer made sense).
252. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
253. See Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?, in
CRITICISM, supra note 234, at 1, 17-19.
254. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 547 (1896); see also id. at 552 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
255. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 344 (1938).
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affirmative action for higher education and other schooling. 256
As a final example, Auer is essentially a subcategory of
Thomas Jefferson or Seminole Rock.
This process of turning cases into categories supports the
argument that statutes, too, may need to be turned into
categories to be applied. Much “law” is produced by Congress
and the courts but only some of it fits into lawyers’ and
judges’ mental outlines.
2.

Chevron’s Caveats Show the Difference Between
Case and Category

“The Chevron decision did not spawn the Chevron
doctrine, so there is no reason to expect [the decision] to
clarify [the doctrine].”257 Indeed, the Chevron opinion is full of
advice about what types of administrative decisions should
receive more or less deference that rarely, if ever, gets
discussed when the Chevron test is applied. For instance, the
language of the Chevron opinion strongly implies that an
agency’s longstanding interpretation of a regulation should
be subject to closer judicial scrutiny.258 Naturally, this is a
position that is not implied by the more concentrated
Chevron test or category,
Indeed, each one of these caveats could result in another
level within the analytical model. For instance, Chevron
asserts that agencies are an appropriate tool for resolving
conflicts because they are democratically accountable
through the president.259 If this were taken seriously, it would
256. 551 U.S. 701, 722-23 (2007) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
328 (2003)).
257. Lawson & Kam, supra note 123, at 74; cf. Connor N. Raso & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What
Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1765
(2010) (“Deference regimes (Chevron, Skidmore, Seminole Rock/Auer) are more
like canons of statutory construction than binding precedents.”).
258. See id. at 863-64 (“[T]he agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis.”).
259. See id. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices . . . .”).
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mean that regulations issued by independent agencies would
deserve less deference.
Similarly, agencies involved in day-to-day operations of
a statute are owed more deference than a body that simply
makes policy and moves on.260 It is also true that the agency
is assumed to have “great expertise.”261 Thus, a court dealing
with a new agency interpreting a new statute would be faced
with a conundrum.
At first it may seem silly to argue that these statements
in Chevron should have any bearing on the test that bears its
name because they are dicta. But “[b]y virtue of the case’s
facts, Chevron’s holding applied only to EPA policy decisions
reached through a formal rulemaking process undertaken to
fill a gap in a statutory scheme Congress authorized the
agency to administer with the force of law.”262 The fact is that
some of Chevron’s reasoning was distilled and turned into a
test that was applied in circumstances beyond the case and
some was not. Yet such caveats can always transform into
full-blown categories, as the Supreme Court may do with
Auer’s caveats.
3.

The Auer Issue in Petit Turns on Whether “Post Hoc
Rationalization” Is a Caveat or Subcategory

Auer states that deference can only be given to a
litigation position if the interpretation is “the agency’s fair
and considered judgment on the matter in question” and if it
is not a “‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency
seeking to defend past agency action against attack.”263 Just
260. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)). Thanks to the
brilliant Kirti Datla for this point.
261. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
262. John S. Kane, Deference as Death Sentence—The Importance of Vigilant
Judicial Review of Refugee-Claim Denials, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 279, 292-93
(2008).
263. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)); see also Bigelow v. Dep’t of Def., 217 F.3d
875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Auer held that so long as there is no basis to suspect
that the agency’s position represents anything less than its considered opinion,
deference is appropriate.”).
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as the Petit Court applied the shopworn Auer standard rather
than the nuances of the Auer opinion, other courts have as
well.
Although dissents and concurrences have hinted at the
limitations of Auer,264 some lower courts have stated that
Auer means mandatory deference to agency litigation
positions without consideration as to whether the litigation
briefs represent the fair and considered judgment or post hoc
rationalizations.265
However, the Supreme Court may be reviving the limits
on the Auer category from the Auer decision. In Christopher
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Court explained Auer
deference as a rule in a category: “Auer ordinarily calls for
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous
regulation, even when that interpretation is advanced in a
legal brief.”266 But then the Court listed all of the caveats,
including the possibility that the agency’s position might not
be its “fair and considered judgment on the matter” or it
might be merely a “post hoc rationalizatio[n].”267
In Christopher, the Court did not wind up applying those
caveats. Rather, it created a new one—that because the
264. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“It seems contrary to fundamental principles of
separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it
as well. . . . [D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages
the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications,
to do what it pleases.”); Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel.
Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66, 83 & n.3 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We cannot
defer to a regulation that does not exist.”).
265. See Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Banks, 690 F.3d 477, 485 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011) (quoting
Auer, 519 U.S. at 461)); Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681
F.3d 427, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“An agency’s permissible interpretation of its own
regulation normally ‘must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ even when the interpretation is
first articulated in the course of litigation.” (quoting Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S.
at 512 (internal citations omitted))); New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Finley,
674 F.3d 225, 236 n.7 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court recently noted that an
agency’s interpretation of its regulations in an amicus brief is worthy of
deference.” (citing Chase Bank, 131 S. Ct. at 880 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461)))).
266. 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012).
267. Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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interpretation in question would “impose potentially massive
liability,” it does not provide “fair warning.”268 Whether
Christopher’s emphasis on the limits of Auer may give them
new life is yet unknown.269 But it is through such repetition
and schematization270 that the Auer limits could gain force.
The next Subsection explains that repetition is important
because it leads to familiarity and categorization.
C. Is § 1406(b) an “Ugly Duckling?”: Familiarity and
Similarity in Categorization
In the fairy tale, the “Ugly Duckling,” the mother duck
treats the titular cygnet as though he were her son because
he was born near ducks and swam like a duck.271 She expects
such birds to be ducks.272 Almost every other bird accepts this
miscategorization, except one old bird.273 But that old bird is
also unable to conceive of the novel circumstance that the
“ugly duckling” can be a swan.274 The old bird thinks that the
cygnet is a poult because the old bird remembers a turkey egg
hatching near duck eggs.275 So powerful is this categorization

268. Id. at 2167 (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHA Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d
154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Under this rationale, larger regulations, and therefore
likely larger regulated entities, would be spared Auer deference. For concerns
about due process notifications and the regulatory state, see generally Mila
Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2013).
269. Compare George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc, 694 F.3d 812,
816 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2165-69, to show that “the
[Supreme] Court as a whole has flagged the subject [of deference to agency briefs]
for further attention”), with Foster v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 640, 649
(6th Cir. 2013) (“Ordinarily, an agency interpretation of its own ambiguous
regulations is entitled to Auer deference.” (citing Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166)).
270. See, e.g., Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
271. Hans Christian Andersen, The Ugly Duckling, PROJECT GUTENBERG (Nov.
8, 2008), http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27200.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Id.
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that even when the duckling realizes he is a swan, he thinks
of the time when he “was an ugly duckling.”276
This story, and the above-described failure of judges and
lawyers to come to grips with the strange § 1406(b), suggests
that categorization can fail to take the weird and unusual
into account. If legal reasoners are trained to overlay
similarity and order on a disordered world, perhaps § 1406(b)
is too much of an ugly duckling to gain relevance.
Hardly. In fact, it could be argued that the opposite is
often true.277 Kuhn argued that when an observer
encountered a black swan, after believing that all swans were
white, he or she would rethink the category of swans or create
a new category for the black bird.278 Similarly, aficionados of
the contact sport, “Duck, Duck, Goose,” would readily note
that the more rarely encountered bird is the more readily
remembered.
When a case stands for an extreme position279 or has
exceedingly unusual facts,280 it can become a benchmark or a
276. Id. (emphasis added).
277. Cf. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 32-33 (Harcourt 1964) (1936) (“That it reached conclusions
quite different from what the ordinary uninstructed person would expect, added,
I suppose, to its intellectual prestige.”); WHITE, supra note 3, at 146 (“People like
strange events and queer happenings . . . .”).
278. See Kuhn, supra note 253, at 1, 17-19.
279. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (suggesting
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) was an important case because it is “the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity”); Korioth v. Brisco, 523 F.2d 1271, 1276 (5th Cir. 1975) (relying on Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) because it “now marks the limit in allowing
taxpayers qua taxpayers standing to litigate a general constitutional claim”).
280. Cf. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 182 (2000)
(“[S]cholars . . . had begun to devote regular attention to new and ‘novel’ cases in
common law fields. . . . Corbin especially proposed that the heart of legal analysis
lay in . . . ‘novel’ fact situations.”); Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our
Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1265 (2002)
(“The minds of future lawyers are sharpened by considering the misfortune of the
fellow with chest hair on his palm; the people chasing each others’ foxes through
the forest . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Zigurds L. Zile, Feature, Vosburg v. Putney:
A Centennial Story, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 877, 877, 984 (noting the immense
popularity of the freakish case Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891),
especially among casebook authors).
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key teaching case. Auer is an example of the outer limits
gaining prominence. Auer says that even an amicus brief can
get deference and so that has become the new standard. Some
strange ideas—the big and shocking Supreme Court holding,
the “Eureka” paradigm change,281 the bizarre fact-pattern—
are captivating. Indeed, these ideas are so captivating that
they are repeated as paradigmatic lessons and therefore onein-a-million cases like Marbury v. Madison282 or Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad283 are more familiar to American
lawyers than the real run-of-the-mill cases that appear in
court.
What makes a category a category, then, is not
mundanity, but a form of familiarity that creates
legitimacy.284 Familiarity here does not mean simply an
awareness of a given law. Judges would not refuse to apply
laws simply because they had not yet encountered them.
Rather, in this context, it means that some laws are so
unconnected to data in the judicial mind that they appear to
lack meaning.285 Laws that lack such provenance may be
especially daunting to enforce in the § 1406(b) context where
the statute appears to allow a liberal judge to exercise his or
her policy preference, helping, for instance, the deaf children
in Petit.
Thus, judges require some sort of guide as to a law’s
meaning. This can be done through a history of precedent or
some other clear sign of legitimacy. For instance, while some
281. See Kuhn, supra note 253, at 1, 5-6 (describing how Karl Popper’s
“favourite examples” are all “startling and destructive in their outcome,” and how
“[h]is emphasis is natural and common: the exploits of a Copernicus or Einstein
make better reading than those of a Brahe or Lorentz,” but that such science is
extraordinary and not normal).
282. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
283. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
284. Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 125-26
(Greenwood Press 1970) (1928) (“Many a statutory innovation that would seem of
sinister or destructive aspect if it were considered in advance, has lost its terror
with its novelty.”); HOFSTADTER & SANDER, supra note 1, at 390 (“Familiarity is
crucial in analogy-making . . . .”); id. at 386.
285. See supra notes 17-19, 73-75, 79 and accompanying text; cf. HOFSTADTER &
SANDER, supra note 1, at 229 (“Understanding utterances like ‘Patsy is a pig’ . . .
is not at all like understanding . . . ‘Patsy is a prawn’ . . . .”).
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judges mistakenly declared the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) unenforceable,286 most other
courts recognized the legitimacy of this well-known but new
law.287
The hold of familiar and legitimate laws on judges is so
powerful that rules that judges commonly apply in one area
of the law often become the rule in similar areas. For
instance, in antidiscrimination and antiretaliation law,
courts and lawyers often apply one statute’s rules to
another.288 The desire to read these statutes in parallel is so
powerful that, even though New York City amended its
antidiscrimination law to state that it should not be read in
parallel with federal law, the Second Circuit recently had to
issue an opinion reminding courts to stop reading them in
parallel.289 Similarly, habeas exhaustion has spread from 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petitions, where it is statutorily required, to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petitions, where it is
not.290 Another example is how the Supreme Court applies the
shopworn presumption against extraterritoriality in the face
of widely different factual and legal circumstances.291
Courts and lawyers feel comfortable applying familiar
analytic models to different situations because a clear
category has been established. For example, when courts
were originally confronted with the phrase “free appropriate
286. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1307, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (grousing about the alleged novelty of the
statute).
287. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581 (2012)
(describing the cases that upheld the PPACA).
288. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578-83 (1978) (reading Fair Labor
Standards Act precedent into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
Marchiano v. Berlamino, No. 10 Civ. 7819, 2012 WL 4215767, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 20, 2012) (construing Age Discrimination in Employment Act, New York
Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL)
retaliation claims under the Civil Rights Act Title VII law).
289. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Chevreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 108-09
(2d Cir. 2013) (“Nonetheless, district courts continued—erroneously—to apply
federal standards to NYCHRL claims.”).
290. See Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 630-34 (2d. Cir 2001).
291. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 70.
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public education,” they immediately drew on standards from
different areas of the law.292
If certain categories tilt the analysis of problems toward
certain results, more familiar categories are more likely to be
applied, and there are network effects strengthening familiar
categories,293 then certain biases would tend to result. Facts
will be more likely to be gathered, described, and analyzed in
light of particular legal frameworks and particular outcomes
become more likely.294
The history of § 1406(b) appears to be such an
overreliance on categories. Even though § 1406(b) is a
statutory limit on the Department of Education’s discretion,
courts have been more likely to defer to regulations based on
other judicial paradigms and lawyers have brought few
§ 1406(b) challenges. Next, Chevron and Auer deference are
more likely to lead to upholding Department of Education
regulations than a strict § 1406(b) model. Category thus
becomes conclusion.
Part II described how categories can colonize a legal
reasoner’s conceptual space and therefore suggests that
judges have failed to consider and lawyers have failed to raise
§ 1406(b) arguments because other prominent categories
occupy their understandings of administrative deference.
Next, Part III suggests how § 1406(b) can break through and
become a category and why § 1406(b) should be enforced more
often.
III. LET ONE THOUSAND, FOUR-HUNDRED AND SIX § 1406(B)S
BLOOM!: HOW AND WHY TO GET MORE § 1406(B)
Part III makes two normative arguments regarding
§ 1406(b). First, Part III.A suggests specific publicity
292. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 93, at 71-72 (“A few courts tried more unusual
approaches, often borrowed from other areas of the law . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).
293. That is, if lawyers expect judges to be more interested in Chevron
arguments than § 1406(b) arguments, they will present fewer § 1406(b)
arguments. And if judges see fewer § 1406(b) arguments and more Chevron
arguments, they might suspect the Chevron arguments are more legitimate.
294. Cf. Feinman, supra note 230, at 698 (“These judicially constructed
representations describe the case and in turn evoke the range of available legal
solutions.”).
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campaigns that could lend greater legitimacy to Section
1406(b) in the minds of the relevant actors. Second, Part III.B
argues that a more frequently used § 1406(b) would be
beneficial because
it would
increase
democratic
accountability, experimentalism, and compensate for the
damage done to IDEA by Rowley.
A. Methods by Which § 1406(b) Can Gain Greater
Prominence and Vitality
While many Notes and Articles conclude by
recommending that Congress enact a specific change or the
Supreme Court overrule a precedent, the problem identified
in this Article concerns law that already exists. The trick is
getting it used.
If this Article is correct that the problem with § 1406(b)
is not that it is inherently unenforceable, not that few IDEA
disputes are resolved before courts,295 not that the fact
circumstances that trigger it have not appeared, not that
judges just dislike it, or any other alternative, then the
problem is generating a “permission structure”296 for lawyers
and judges to accept § 1406(b) as a valid category of cases.
1. Publicize § 1406(b) to Litigants
This Article has argued that § 1406(b) fails to register
with litigants and judges as a legitimate category of litigation
because it is less familiar. Therefore, an obvious answer is to
increase familiarity through a publicity campaign. There are
probably many ways to educate education law specialists
295. See Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1423 n.43 (2011).
296. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992) (“Our law
reviews are now full of mediocre interdisciplinary articles. Too many law
professors are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject piques their
interest, whether or not the subject merits scholarship, and whether or not they
have the scholarly skills to master it.”); David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law
Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at A1 (quoting Chief Justice
Roberts’s and Justice Breyer’s criticism of legal scholarship as too removed from
practical experience).
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about § 1406(b). For instance, continuing legal education or
“CLE” lectures could be held on the subject. Increasing
awareness among education litigators seems like an easy
task because it is likely that they have existing networks297
and media outlets298 devoted to the topic of improving
representation of students in special education. More to the
point, education litigators are motivated to press as many
strong claims as possible. Because education litigators look
to win, the real key to widespread initiation of § 1406(b) suits
would be judicial acceptance.
2. Publicize § 1406(b) to Judges
However, judges are likely harder to persuade about the
merits of § 1406(b). Judges are primarily focused on getting
the answer “right,” which, in turn, implies relying on stable,
existing answers, as suggested in Part II.A.2 of this Article.
Therefore, it seems like an “all-of-the-above” media strategy
would be wise to create the permission structure for judges.
a. Through Congressional Action. Despite the fact that
Congress does not need to say more to make § 1406(b) into
law, passing more laws like it will make it likelier that it will
be a category. Section 1406(b) sits like Chekhov’s gun,
waiting to discharge.299 If Congress starts hanging guns on
the mantle of every legal protection that it wants to
preserve,300 courts will become more familiar with laws of
that type.301
Thus, when Congress reauthorizes other legislation,
particularly involving education or the rights of individuals
with disabilities, it should have similar “lock-in” provisions.
As litigants litigate on lock-in provisions in other contexts
297. See,
e.g.,
Education
Law
Section,
N.C.
BAR
ASS’N,
http://educationlaw.ncbar.org/. Of course, practitioners representing educators
have their own organizations as well. See, e.g., EDUC. LAW ASS’N,
http://educationlaw.org/.
298. See, e.g., EDUC. WEEK, http://www.edweek.org/ew/index.html.
299. See, e.g., Peter Brooks, “Inevitable Discovery”—Law, Narrative,
Retrospectivity, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 71, 76 (2003) (“[T]he gun hung on the wall
in Act I of the play is waiting to be discharged at someone’s head in Act III.”).
300. But cf. Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
301. See supra notes 288-92 and accompanying text.
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and courts see them more frequently, the analytical model
will become a common step that judges will expect.
Congress could also hold congressional hearings and
press releases, but these may not reach judges.
b. Through Cases and Amicus Briefs. There are many
obvious ways to bring judicial eyeballs to the text of § 1406(b).
The most direct way to get judges to consider § 1406(b) as a
normal category is to launch a multitude of suits to make
§ 1406(b) challenges seem as normal as other federal
lawsuits.
Following that, the next most direct route to judicial
eyeballs would be for an organization to file amicus briefs in
IDEA cases. Indeed, as described above, the Department of
Education’s amicus brief in Jefferson County caused the
Eleventh Circuit to construct its counterintuitive § 1406(b)
holding.
c. Through Academic Interest. Another possible route to
attracting judicial attention to § 1406(b) is increased
academic interest. However, leading judges seen as “liberal”
and “conservative” have announced that they no longer see
value in legal scholarship because of its focus on abstract,
abstruse, or multidisciplinary material at the expense of
practicality.302 For example, if an academic writes an article
about § 1406(b) with the intention of promoting its use, but
then gunks up the article with fuzzy talk about cognitive
science gleaned from secondary sources, that article might
not be read by a judge working on a case—or worse, the
attempted multidisciplinary aspect of the article may
associate the main idea with Ivory Tower, outside-themainstream thinking. That is, the judge might say that it is
“for the birds.”
d. Through Seminars. There are other direct ways to get
judicial attention. For instance, interest groups in other
302. See, e.g., Ezra Klein, “So About that ‘Permission Structure’ . . . ,” WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (May 3, 2013, 3:47 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2013/05/03/so-about-that-permission-structure/ (describing the
Obama Administration’s theory that voters would only take the novel step of
voting for a black candidate if third persons made that vote seem normal or
permissible).
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issues host seminars to educate judges on their positions.303
Because § 1406(b) is such a narrow topic, the seminar would
have to find allied issues or interest groups to support it.
e. Through Potential Law Clerks. A more indirect way of
drawing more attention to § 1406(b) is through judicial law
clerks. How much, if any, influence clerks have with their
judges is a debated topic.304 Even if clerks’ influence on judges
is de minimis, a clerk’s framework of the law is easier to
influence because it is so unformed and part of the “ideal” role
of the clerk is to “introduce[] new ideas.”305 Therefore,
educational material to law students, who, in turn, are future
clerks, would be a low-cost way to try to introduce § 1406(b)
to judges.
The above has described how to get judges to enforce §
1406(b). The next Subsection describes why judges should enforce it.
B. Why § 1406(b) Should Be Given More Prominence
Section 1406(b) should be used more frequently because
judges and agencies should respond to the will of Congress
and thereby promote democratic accountability. Because this
issue goes to the heart of the American system of
government, it should be sufficient. For some, however, the
appeal to democratic accountability may not be enough. After
all, there are “many [federal] laws—environmental,
securities, criminal, civil—that are rarely enforced.”306
Therefore, other reasons are also considered. Use of § 1406(b)
promotes experimentation with and implementation of novel
ideas, a philosophy of legislating that may be necessary to
303. See Chris Young et al., Corporations, Pro-business Nonprofits Foot Bill for
Judicial Seminars, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/03/28/12368/corporations-pro-businessnonprofits-foot-bill-judicial-seminars.
304. See, e.g., Todd C. Peppers et al., Inside Judicial Chambers: How Federal
District Court Judges Select and Use Their Law Clerks, 71 ALB. L. REV. 623, 635
(2008) (noting the debate).
305. Arthur M. Boley, Pretrial Motions in a U.S. District Court: The Role of the
Law Clerk, JUDICATURE, June-July 1990, at 44, 44.
306. Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-Wing
Law Professors Are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207, 2216 (2006)
(book review).
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circumvent the current deadlock at the federal level. Third,
and finally, § 1406(b) should be used more frequently to
ensure that the Department never promulgates regulations
that promote the rejected Bell policies and to make up for
Rowley’s limitation of IDEA’s purpose.
1. Democratic Accountability
Ironically, the problems that § 1406(b) meant to
address—judges and agencies undermining Congress’s
provision of certain rights to students with disabilities—are
also problems that prevent the enforcement of § 1406(b).
However, as Chevron argued, statutory interpretation and
deference to regulations should be based on democratic
accountability.307
Democratic accountability relies on the idea of
intentionality. To have democratic accountability in America,
voters must deliberately choose agents, who, in turn, must
deliberately make policy choices that their constituencies
favor.308 Often, however, legislators try to minimize the
possibility of being attacked for taking the wrong action and
try to take ambiguous positions.309 When Congress leaves its
purposes vague, presidents,310 courts,311 and unelected
bureaucrats will repurpose legislation. Enforcing § 1406(b)
would make IDEA regulations more democratically
307. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 86566 (1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is . . . .”).
308. Cf. D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671,
694 (2013) (“Elections can help select agents who are likely to have similar
interests as principals and provide incentives for agents to act faithfully to
increase their chances of reelection.”).
309. Cf. Michael C. Pollack, Note, Chevron’s Regrets: The Persistent Vitality of
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 316, 322 (2011) (“[T]he only
disincentive against the passage of ambiguous legislation is the extent to which
Congress wants to make a definitive policy choice.”).
310. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2312-13 (2001) (describing how President Clinton used “directive
authority . . . as an end run around Congress”).
311. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petro. Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
613-14, 637-40 (1980) (reading cost-benefit analysis into a statute’s purpose).
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accountable because it would increase the role of Congress
against agencies and judges and would make state decision
making more open.
a. Democratic Accountability Requires Agencies to Listen
to Congress. Although § 1406(b) does not clearly provide a
given set of protections, it makes Congress’s priorities in the
IDEA scheme clear. While parents of special education
students may call their congressperson, it is hard to imagine
a single voter, other than perhaps the Petits, whose
presidential ballot could be swung by a cochlear implant
mapping regulation.312 IDEA regulatory choices are more
democratically accountable through Congress.
As discussed in Part I, the purpose of § 1406(b) was to
prevent the Department of Education from undermining
Congress’s intent in the IDEA scheme (as well as the
procedural requirements of GEPA). Additionally, enforcing
statutes like IDEA would encourage Congress to make its
purpose clearer at the time of enactment. Therefore, §
1406(b) enhances IDEA’s democratic accountability as
against agencies.
b. Section 1406(b) Is a Check on Judicial Discretion.
Section 1406(b) checks judicial discretion in two broad ways.
First, it checks the discretion of the judiciary to defer to
administrative decisions. Second, it checks judicial discretion
by making clearer which outcomes are in agreement with
Congress’s intent.
It is a matter of simple democratic and constitutional
theory that courts should defer to congressionally imposed
limitations on administrative power.313 It is for that reason
that applying Chevron in the face of Congress’s decision as to
what IDEA regulations are legal should be seen as
312. See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 52-70
(2013) (describing “the weak link between presidential control and democratic
accountability”).
313. See Burt Neuborne, Serving the Syllogism Machine: Reflections on Whether
Brandenburg Is Now (or Ever Was) Good Law, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 32 (2011)
(“If more than one command exists, the judge applies a democratically derived
political hierarchy: a constitutional command trumps a statutory command,
which, in turn, trumps an executive regulation, which displaces the judge-made
common law.”).
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discretionary and a violation of Chevron’s own theory that
deference is owed to agencies because Congress so chose.314
Because “most judges still share a belief that principled
decision making is the essence of the judicial function,”315
such behavior makes more sense as an overreliance of the
distillation of the Chevron doctrine into an analytical model
than as a willful disregard of the statute.
Second, § 1406(b) checks judicial discretion by hinting at
Congress’s priorities in a choice between increasing or
decreasing protection. This is particularly important because
violations of IDEA—with its “vague or ambiguous
language”—are enforced in the courts, making IDEA
“judicially administered” and giving courts “policymaking
authority” and “substantial discretion.”316
Without § 1406(b) setting a floor, courts might make
more independent decisions as to the comparative values of,
for instance, substantive protections or costs to local school
districts. In this sense, the Eleventh Circuit used § 1406(b)
correctly in Jefferson County as guidance to determine
whether Congress would have preferred the status quo or the
school district’s interpretation, which was more in line with
Bell’s proposed regulations.
c. Section 1406(b) Enhances Democratic Accountability
Through the States. Arguably, IDEA as a whole weakens
democratic accountability by placing decisions about state
and local programs in federal hands.317 Therefore, to the
extent § 1406(b) requires states to provide more services, it
may be seen as reducing democratic accountability. However,
§ 1406(b) increases democratic accountability by making it
314. See Sunstein, supra note 125, at 198; see also Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 123, at 872.
315. Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of
Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 838 (1991).
316. Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 370-72
(2010).
317. Cf. Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1356-58 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Luttig, J., dissenting) (decrying IDEA for taking power away from states and
thereby harming democracy and removing choices from people), rev’d en banc, 106
F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
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clearer what states must do when they receive IDEA funds.
This can be seen by analogy to New York v. United States.318
New York explained that influencing state behavior
through conditioned spending was likely to be acceptable in
part because “[i]f a State’s citizens view federal policy as
sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may elect to
decline a federal grant.”319 By contrast, compelling state
legislatures to regulate was unconstitutional because, among
other things, it diminished democratic accountability: “[I]t
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision.”320 By reducing uncertainty
over IDEA protections, it makes a state’s decision to enter
into IDEA a decision that is made “in full view of the
public.”321 But democratic accountability is not the only
reason why § 1406(b) should be enforced.
2. Experimentation
Kuhn argued that when scientists were not engaged in
the rare task of overthrowing and reconstructing paradigms,
they were almost always engaged in puzzle solving.322 So, too,
the normal legislature should not be crafting a scheme to
reorder American life but to tinker to achieve goals. Two very
well-known models of legislative experimentalism—Justice
Brandeis’s and Franklin Roosevelt’s—focused on situations
in which the goal was identified.
Both Brandeis and Roosevelt promoted experimentalism
in the face of known and obvious problems: economic
inequality and the Depression.323 One of the most quoted
318. 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
319. Id. at 168.
320. Id. at 168-69.
321. Id. at 168.
322. See Kuhn, supra note 253, at 4-5.
323. See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR
TIME 34 (2013) (noting that Depression-era leaders were faced with a very specific
set of problems, but “[b]ecause they possessed no fixed or sure policy approaches
or remedies . . . , they could consider a very wide repertoire of policies”).
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passages in all of American jurisprudence is Justice
Brandeis’s paean to experimentalism in response to economic
regulation in Oklahoma: “It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”324
While Brandeis’s experimentalism was notable for
relying on the states, Roosevelt’s experimentalism was in
support of a larger federal government response to the
Depression: “The country needs and, unless I mistake its
temper,
the
country
demands
bold,
persistent
experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and
try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above
all, try something.”325
By contrast with Brandeis’s and Roosevelt’s
experimentalism, the “spirit of 1406” is not about
centralizing or decentralizing, nor is it in response to agreed
upon problems. Rather, § 1406(b) indicates that, as both
political parties become more and more hardened as to
ends,326 the only hope for moving any legislation lies in
finding means.
Section 1406(b) was a way in which congressional
liberals of both parties and President Reagan could agree to
proceed on education regulation. Today, bipartisanship tends
to be most likely to break out when the parties try a new
means. For instance, conservative Democrats and
Republicans tried to work around the stalemate over more
324. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
325. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Oglethorpe University in Atlanta,
Georgia
(May
22,
1932),
THE
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88410 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014); see
also Eugene V. Rostow, Bituminous Coal and the Public Interest, 50 YALE L.J.
543, 543 (1941) (“One of President Roosevelt’s most appealing intellectual claims
for the New Deal was that it would experiment with policy, and would discard the
experiments which failed to work.”).
326. Cf. Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, The Election and the Future,
DEMOCRACY, Fall 2012, at 40, 41 (“Republicans launched their unending political
war against the President from the first day of his Administration, in the midst
of an economic crisis, in single-minded pursuit of their goals . . . .”).
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versus fewer guns by calling for background checks. 327 The
risk, of course, is that, as the means itself becomes seen as a
goal that a party ideologically needs to block, a less
aggressive debate over what was formerly considered a
means is no longer possible.328 For instance, when the
National Rifle Association weighed in against background
checks, it made background checks and an alleged federal
gun database the ends rather than the parties’ earlier goals
of increased or decreased gun ownership.329 It is this shifting
of the window of bipartisanship that made the Republicans’
1993 health care reform bill an acceptable and experimental
means to an agreed-upon problem, yet when much of it was
later redubbed “Obamacare,” it was considered a grave
threat to constitutional liberty.330
Thus, in order to find grounds for compromise—or better
still, collaboration—legislators will have to find new means
that put the other side in a defensive posture. Because
legislators are not particularly invested in methodologies,331

327. See S. Amend. 715 to S. 649, 113th Cong. (2013).
328. See Diana Epstein & John D. Graham, Polarized Politics and Policy
Consequences, RAND. CORP 9 (2007), available at http://www.rand.org
/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP197.pdf
(“[P]olarization around moral issues in which parties disagree about the
fundamental outcomes to achieve is more potent than polarization around
economic issues in which parties agree on economic or other policy goals.” (quoting
David W. Brady & Hahrie C. Han, Polarization Then and Now: A Historical
Perspective, in 1 RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF
AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 119-51 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds.,
2006))).
329. See Susan Page, Sen. Manchin: Other Tough Issues Complicated Gun Vote,
USA TODAY (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2013/04/18/sen-joe-manchin-gun-vote-immigration-gay-marriage/2093161/?utm_
source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+usatodayNewsTopStories+%28USATODAY+-+News+Top+Stories%29 (arguing that the
NRA’s opposition caused the background check bill to fail to meet a procedural
hurdle).
330. See, e.g., Maggie Mertens, The Democrats’ 2010 Health Reform Plan Evokes
1993 Republican Bill, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/checking-In-With/Durenberger-1993-gop-billq-and-a.aspx?p=1.
331. Cf. Ezra Klein, Don’t Read the Bill!, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Sept. 25, 2009,
6:00
PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/09/
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procedural innovations like § 1406(b) are where to make the
action happen. In a football game where each yard lost is
considered a grievous injury and touchdowns are forbidden
except by agreement between the teams, the players need to
change the rules, such as by widening the field, to prevent
the same fruitless goalline dogpiles. If lawyers are unwilling
to accept experimental and strange laws that are otherwise
unimpeachable, such experimentation quickly loses its
allure.
3.

Section 1406(b) Better Fulfills the Purpose of IDEA
than a Petit IDEA

a. Preventing the Promulgation of a Replication of
Reagan’s Rejected Regulations. As Justice Cardozo explained:
Almost always, a statute has only a single point in view. All history
demonstrates that legislation intervenes only when a definite
abuse has disclosed itself, through the excess of which public feeling
has finally been aroused. When the legislator interposes, it is to put
an end to such and such facts, very clearly determined, which have
provoked his decision.332

Thus, Congress has asserted that the Bell regulations
were such “a definite abuse,” and few have said otherwise. As
judges and litigators are seen to reject the “logical
consequences” of the “general ideas and abstract formula[]” 333
presented in § 1406(b), they may be seen as tacitly welcoming
the harmful content of Bell’s regulations as well. As
emphasized throughout this Article, Petit could be the
opening wedge of the promulgation of all Bell’s regulations.
Although “audiology” services were not expressly limited by
Bell’s regulations, the regulations addressed the same
concerns as the opponents of mandatory provision of
mapping when they limited “medical” services, such as the

dont_read_the_bill.html (arguing that Senators do not care about the technical
details in the text of bills).
332. CARDOZO, supra note 17, at 144.
333. Id.
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expense and expertise required.334 Thus, except where the
pre-1983 regulations are extremely clear, the Department, in
the future, could use Auer deference to deprive children with
disabilities of the services they need to receive a free
appropriate public education. While some may argue that the
costs of providing these protections outweigh the obvious
benefits, they should not be allowed to deprive students of
their mandated related services, swooping down silently in
the dead of night like a great horned owl.335
b. A Restrained End Run Around Rowley. Perhaps
willfully, Justice Rehnquist announced a false understanding
of the IDEA scheme in Rowley: that IDEA only required that
the children with disabilities be “given access to an adequate,
publicly supported education” and that “the education to
which access is provided be sufficient to confer some
educational benefit upon the handicapped child.”336 That
assertion of a limited congressional intent has resulted in
reduced services to children with disabilities.337 There has
been extensive disagreement with Rehnquist’s interpretation
of what level of education a school must apply.338 Moreover,
other trends have contributed to a narrowing of IDEA.339 But,
both as originally enacted340 and as further amendments have

334. See Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 47 Fed.
Reg. 33,836, 33,837-38 (Aug. 4, 1982) (codified at 300 C.F.R. pt. 300); Omang,
supra note 45, at A1.
335. See Val Cunningham, Night’s Silent Hunters Are Nearby, MINN.
STARTRIBUNE (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://www.startribune.com/lifestyle/
homegarden/143512846.html.
336. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 176, 193, 200 (1982).
337. See Babin, supra note 96, at 226-28.
338. See Noble, supra note 94, at 450, 457 & n.181 (collecting sources).
339. See supra note 95 (collecting sources).
340. See Weber, supra note 73, at 95, 104 (noting that the dissent found more
legislative history in support of “‘full educational opportunity,’ ‘equal educational
opportunity,’ education tailored to ‘enable the child to “achieve his or her
maximum potential,’” and an education ‘equivalent, at least, to the one those
children who are not handicapped receive’” (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 213-14
(White J., dissenting))).
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been tacked on,341 IDEA and its predecessors have meant to
accomplish more.
As a result, applying § 1406(b) to increase educational
opportunities for students with disabilities is a way for lower
courts to compensate for binding precedent that puts a ceiling
on what services participating states must provide.342
Although this trade does not work as well as the famous
decision to incorporate the Bill of Rights through the Due
Process Clause rather than the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, it is a trade that judges should make to better fulfill
Congress’s intent in enacting and reenacting IDEA.
For the reasons discussed above, increasing democratic
accountability, promoting innovative experimentalism, and
enforcing the duly passed and enacted legislative scheme of
IDEA, § 1406(b) ought to be raised and enforced more
frequently, and experiments like § 1406(b) should be
attempted in other substantive areas of law and other levels
of government, such as by the states.
CONCLUSION
Section 1406(b) was enacted into law by Congress to
prevent the Department of Education from diminishing
protections for some of our most vulnerable citizens—
children with disabilities. Yet in the past thirty years, the
law has seemingly stood as mute as Louis the Swan and as
much a pariah as the Ugly Duckling. To give § 1406(b) voice,
it must be seen as one of the gang. Section 1406(b) has to
become a familiar category. Only when § 1406(b) occupies
cognitive space that gives it legitimacy will it be consistently
applied. Turning § 1406(b) from outcast to category will make
Congress’s speech intelligible, make IDEA more
democratically
accountable,
encourage
legislative
experimentation, and help work around Rowley. But until
§ 1406(b) can find its cognitive perch on which to roost, it
might as well be for the birds.

341. See supra note 95.
342. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748
(2011) (“Squeezing law is often like squeezing a balloon. The contents do not
escape, but erupt in another area . . . .”).

